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INTRODUCTION 
 
Migration is one of the most important phenomena in the world. Humanity’s entire existence 
is based on it and therefore was and is still nowadays the norm and not the exception to the 
rule. 
 
Europe has always been a continent loved by immigrants. The immigration flows have never 
stopped but on the contrary, in the recent years have become more immense and problematic 
than ever. The problems came in when the types of immigrants that were arriving in Europe 
start to change. In the past, the individuals that decided to migrate were searching for better 
condition, better jobs and were mostly permanent residents that wanted to be integrated into 
the society. Nowadays the major part of immigrants that crosses the borders are refugees and 
illegal immigrants that rejects the integration and expects to live relying on the welfare of the 
European States.  
 
Since 2014 the number of these categories of immigrants increased dramatically. Only in 
2014 about 283,532 illegal immigrants and refugees coming mostly from Syria, Eritrea and 
Afghanistan crossed the European Union borders. In 2015 the situation became even more 
dramatic when around 1 million immigrants entered in Europe and asked for asylum to the 
European States. The biggest part of them choose to ask asylum in countries like Germany, 
Sweden and Austria that were more open to immigration than the others.  
In 2016 the situation has improved slightly compared to previous years due to the EU/Turkey 
statement, an increased in the border controls and the application of measures implemented by 
the EU and by the Member States.  
 
Taking in refugees and fighting against illegal immigration is not cheap. Italy in 2015 spent 
more than $9.7 million a month only to sustain a program to find and rescue migrants’ ships. 
Turkey spent more than $4.5 billion to guarantee the access to immigrants to basic services 
like health care and education. The cost of taking in migrants is not measured only in dollars 
but also in anti-immigrants’ attitudes that in the last year have risen across the continent.  
 
In Chapter 3 of this work was studied the categories of individuals that were against 
immigration in 2014, so before the beginning of the real immigration crisis. It was made an 
empirical analysis of the attitudes of European natives toward immigrants within and across 
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countries, using an individual-level survey data set. It was controlled for economic and non-
economic issues but also for security and cultural issues.  
 
The results of the analysis shows that in 2014, the European society was more open to 
immigration than it seems to be nowadays. Young individuals, high skilled, male, both 
religious and non-religious individulas were all more open to new immigration waves. The 
countries where these positive immigration feelings were mostly present were: Belgium, 
Germany, France, Norway, Sweden and Poland.   
 
Nowadays the patterns of immigration are shaped both by the government policy which 
attempt to control immigration flows in the national interest and by the European Union.  
At the national level the current trend seem to be for governments to try to manage 
immigration more efficiently. National policies on immigration involve hard work in: 
deciding the admission rates for the regular immigrants that are coming from the third 
countries to seek work, promoting the integration of legally resident third-country nationals 
and combating illegal immigration by giving sanctions to airlines and other travel operators or 
to employers of illegal immigrants.  
The European Union instead must: decide the conditions for both, the legal entry and 
residence in Member States and for family reunification, support the measures taken by the 
Member States to promote integrations, reduce and prevent irregular immigration and 
conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of their country of origin 
nationals.  
 
While the European Union is trying to manage the immigration crisis by increasing the 
borders controls, increasing the resources available for immigration, reducing the incentives 
of irregular immigration, developing a common asylum policy and the blue-card system the 
European countries at a national level are taking measures to control and limit the number of 
immigrants. Sweden, Austria, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary and France were the first 
countries that in 2016 adopted radical measures to limit and control for immigration. The only 
country in Europe that continues with its open-arms policy is Germany that in 2016 took 
important measures to better integrated the asylum seekers.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Definition, Classification and History  
 
1.1 Definition of migration 
 
For most people the word migration suggests a vision of “brave” movements of whole 
population over long distances. This term, nowadays, is considered as one of the most 
important phenomena in the world.  
 
When Arctic Tern (Sterna paradisaea)1 appears in Antarctica, when Monarch Butterfly 
(Danaus plexippus)2 is observed in Mexico, or when the Dragonflies (Pantala flavescens)3 is 
sighted in the Maldives, Seychelles, Mozambique and Uganda, people recognize that is 
occurring a special type of animal movement which forms an essential component of the life 
history and ecological niche of the organism. This phenomenon is found in all major animal 
groups including fish, reptile, birds, mammals, insects, amphibians, crustaceans and can be 
caused by: climate change, local availability of food and mating reasons.  
 
As well as the animals, even the human being feels the need to migrate in new locations.  
Human migration is like animal migration but it is more difficult to understand the reasons 
behind it and to study its implications.   
 
So far there is no exact definition of the term “Human migration” but only different points of 
view about its meaning. In a simply way Human migration can be defined as the movement of 
people from one place to another with the intention of setting temporarily or permanently in 
the new location. In this definition, no restriction is made between voluntary or involuntary 
nature of the act. 
 
Each act of migration must have: an origin, a destination and an intervening set of obstacles 
like the distance or the difficulty to move.  
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Bird that travels 71,000 km per year and flies from Greenland and the Arctic to Antarctica 
2 Flies from Canada to south Mexico. 
3 Insect that travels 14,000 – 18,000 km per year 
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The International Organization for Migration defines migration as: 
 “The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international 
border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of 
movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes 
migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving 
for other purposes, including family reunification”. 
 
In this definition, no restriction is made between external and internal migration or between 
the nature of the act (voluntary or involuntary). 
 
Nowadays there are different definitions regarding the word “migrant” given by different 
important associations or organizations like: 
 
 
a) The UN Refugee Association:  
“Any person who moves, usually across an international border, to join family 
members already abroad, to search for a livelihood or for a range of other 
purposes.” 
 
b) The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):  
"Any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she 
was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country." 
 
c) The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants:  
"Is a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”.  
 
d) The European Commission:  
“A person who leaves from one country or region to settle in another, often in 
search of a better life” 
 
These last definitions consider migrants only the voluntary one so for example refugees or 
other people who are forced to abandon their home are not included in this category. 
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Until now it can be notice that there is a lot of confusion about the meaning of these two 
words and no definition between these can be considered as the only one “right”.  
 
There are two fundamental things which distinguish migration from any other phenomenon: 
duration and distance (Kok Pieter, 1999). 
 
The minimum duration of stay to be considered as migration, varies across countries. The 
United Nations defines immigrants those individuals that move their residence in the host 
country for one year or more and shorter periods are classified as visits. For twelve countries 
in the world migrants are considerate only those that decide to establish permanent residence; 
for eight countries, the duration of the stay to be considerate migrant is three months or more 
and for nine countries in the world there is no clear criterion to identify migrants.  
 
The distance is not well defined but what matters in this case is the change of community. For 
example, a person who moves from one home to another in the same neighborhood is not 
considered a migrant. If we consider a nation as a community, then all international 
movements will be classified as migration.   
 
The problem with migration is that is hard to understand who the migrants are and how to 
distinguish them from natives. For example, if we consider hypothetically the natives like all 
people who have a residence and domicile in a country it will be hard to classify a vagrant 
which is a person without a domicile, or if we consider native all persons who have 
citizenship it will be hard to distinguish between those who born there among those who have 
acquired citizenship in time.  
 
To try to understand what the word migration means first we should try to answer these four 
questions:  
 
a) Who lives here now? 
 
b) Where did they live - then? 
 
c) Who else lived here then? 
 
d) Where do they live now? 
 
 
To give an answer to these questions is very difficult because two operations should be done: 
looking in several places and tracking people forward in time. These two operations are very 
expensive and require a long period of analysis. (Tilly, 1976) 
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1.2 Classification of migration 
There are so many ways in which migration can be classified. The most important difference 
is between local or internal migration and international migration. The first one is the 
movement of individual or families from one area to another within national boundaries, 
while the international is the movement from one country to another. International migration 
is the highest. In the middle 1990s about 145 million individuals moved away from their 
origin countries and in the 2005 the number increased and reached 175 million4. 
 
International migrants can be classified as legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees. 
Legal immigrants are those that possess all the required and correct documents to enter in a 
country. Illegal are those individuals that violate the law of the country and cross the border 
illegally. Irregular and undocumented immigrants are included in this category.   
The International Organization for Migration gives a perfect definition for refugee. A refugee 
is:  
 “A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinions, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country.” 
 
 
Very often the boundary between legality and illegality is easily crossed. A regularization law 
or an amnesty can transform legal immigrants into illegal virtually overnight. Furthermore, a 
legal migrant may work in the illegal economy or vice versa an illegal migrant may work 
without hindrance in the legal economy.  
Also the difference between internal and international migration is often blurred and occurs 
when international borders change or when the national states become less important for 
migration (Schengenland). This last case is very particular because creates new obstacles for 
the immigrants coming from outside the European Union and gives a special treatment to 
immigrants from inside the Union. Significant international frontier shifts affect drastically 
migration status because turns local migration into international migration and vice versa. 
Some famous cases of this phenomenon that occurred in Europe are: the breakup of 
                                                          
4 
 Population Reference Bureau 
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Yugoslavia, the former of the Soviet Union or the unification of Germany (Russell King, 
2002). 
 
Another important classification of migration is between: voluntary and involuntary. The first 
one is attributable to the person’s will to migrate and can be within one’s region, country or 
beyond.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of migrants by reasons. (Source: NSS, 2012) 
 
 
Represents about 90, 20% of total migration and is due to many factors that attract immigrants 
to the host countries (Das, Haldar, Das Gupta, Sen, 2014). These factors are called “pull 
factors” and include: booming economy (better job opportunities), favorable immigration 
laws, improved life style, environment friendly climate, better civic amenities and many 
others.  
 
An example of this type of migration is Japan who is in a situation of labor absence. Because 
of this situation, Japan is receiving a record number of legal and illegal immigrants that are 
destined to fill the low-status, low-paying and dangerous jobs that are rejected by Japanese 
natives (Ganelli and Miake, 2015). According to the United Nations, Japan would need 17 
million immigrants by 2050.  
Even though Japan is not offering to migrants the optimal conditions to live, a lot of them 
coming from the poorest countries in the world, decide to take this opportunity. The main 
reason for which they take this decision is that their actual conditions are worse than those 
that Japan is offering.  
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The involuntary migration is due to the worsening of living conditions like: natural disasters 
(24%), social political problems (58%), evacuation for development policies (18%) that force 
people to move. All these factors are called “push factors”.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of migrants by reasons. (Source: NSS, 2012) 
 
 
Migrations can be classified also in other ways. For example, if is considering the distance 
and the duration of the move is possible to classify migration in four types:  
 
1) Local - fundamental is the distance which is quite small. The migrant will move 
within a geographically neighboring market.  
 
2) Circular – the distance can be long or short but the important thing is time; the 
migrant will return to the country of origin after a well-defined interval of time. 
 
3) Chain – new immigrants are helped with aid and information by the people at the 
destination (who are people that have migrate previously) 
 
4) Career – fundamental are both time and distance. The migrant will move far/close for 
a definitive period in response to work and living opportunities. 
 
Circular and chain migration tend to fight high cost of information regarding employment 
opportunities so they give way to local and career migration while career and circular 
migration offer skills that are available only in migrants (Tilly, 1976).  
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This last classification does not consider the difference between forced and voluntary 
migration that was considered previously so to distinguish easily among local, circular, chain 
and career migration is obligatory to know life histories of migrants and intentions and social 
relations at the time of move. 
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1.3 History of migration in Europe 
 
Humans have always had the need to migrate. It is thanks to this need that they have spread 
widely over the face of the earth and have been exposed to the most diversified conditions. 
The occupation of the earth was reached thanks to two fundamental human forces: the ability 
to grow demographically and the ability to move in other places. This last one gave humans a 
fundamental gift: the capability to adapt to changing environmental circumstances (Livi-
Bacci, 2012). Furthermore, these forces have started a complex selection process where the 
individuals that moved in other places started to increase their ability to survive and to adapt 
to different climate and places. In time, these individuals became stronger that the ones that 
were left behind.   
 
Charles Darwin sustained that migration from the origins of humanity up to present, has been 
the key element of social and biological evolution. It is a human characteristic that, in time, 
has promoted the diffusion, consolidation and growth of humans. 
 
At this point is very important to address the wider question: “Is migration the exception or the 
norm?” In Europe (and in other developed countries) only a minority of people were born, live their 
lives, and die in the same community or settlement. Migration, at some point, inevitably takes place.  
Furthermore, it should be remembered that there are many people and cultures whose existence is 
based on immigration or on a history of migration. So, are immigrants therefore still “the others” who 
are different from us? Or all of us are, in some way or another, migrants or the product of migration? 
(Cohen, 1995: 8) The answers can be found by analyzing the Europeans migration history.  
 
Europe has gone through different stages regarding migration.  
 
Stage one consisted in the migration of non-Europeans in Europe. It started with the first 
phenomenon of human migration that happened during the Neolithic Revolution. This period 
is famous for the emergence of agriculture. It began in the Fertile Crescent, 9.000 years ago, 
and continued until reached the British Isles, 5.000 years ago. New ideas and techniques were 
implemented first in the Fertile Crescent and then adopted in the British Isles. This happened 
because agriculture increased human living standards which ended up in a demographic 
growth. Individuals felt the need to have more space for their agriculture and they decided to 
move near their villages at the beginning and then more and more distant. This process 
continued at a rate of roughly 1km per year until reached the British Islands (Ammerman and 
Cavalli-Sforza, 1986).  
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This period of migration was unique because occurred in areas not very populated so migrants 
rarely had to get in touch with natives and to compete for resources. Situations as before do 
not have ever occurred in the history. 
 
Over the last 2000 years there was a population boom which has made almost all areas 
densely populated. Individuals who decided to abandon their land and migrate had to interact 
with natives and most of the time these interactions had ended up in conflicts. These conflicts 
happened because migrants were more developed than natives so they had the strength to 
impose their lifestyle.  
 
Stage two consisted in the immigration of Europeans in Europe. It started in the modern era. 
During this period, Europe was characterized by many migratory movements. Most of these 
movements had the purpose of invasion and settlement. A perfect example is the “Drang nach 
Osten” which consist in the movement and settlement of Germanic people in Europe. They 
started to extend their territories after the fall of the Roman Empire until the fourteenth 
century. Their purpose was to migrate towards the East and settle in those territories that were 
occupied by Slavs over the previous millennium. The main reason for this movement was the 
abundance land available and the technological and organizational superiority compared to 
the native populations.  These first migration movements gave very favorable conditions that 
triggered successive waves of migration. These last ones ended up in a slow process of 
colonization of Europe by the German people in only three centuries.  
 
Other examples are the movements of the Scandinavian people and the Reconquista of the 
Iberian Peninsula which ended in the fifteenth century (Livi-Bacci, 2000). Scandinavians 
migration was quite different from the previous ones. In the ninth century, Scandinavian 
people started to migrate first in the heart of the European continent and then in less 
hospitable lands like Iceland, Shetland and Orkney Islands and in Greenland.  
The Reconquista happened for military and political reasons and not for religious. Christians 
conquered and settled in these lands because they wanted to expel from the Peninsula the 
Muslim rulers. The Muslim communities were defeated easily because they did not have the 
organization and power to defend themselves from Christians.   
All these historical episodes of migration can be considered as voluntary migration because 
the decision to migrate was taken by the people and not forced by circumstances.  
 
The slave trade during the colonial period is considerate the largest involuntary mass 
migration in human history.  
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Europe was not heavily hit by this forced immigration. The big part of slaves were destined to 
the American continent. 
 
 
Figure 3: Destination of Enslaved Africans 1500-1870 (Source: Albert M. Craig, World Civilizations) 
 
 
Stage three consisted in the immigration of Europeans and non-Europeans in Europe. This 
stage starts with the end of the slaves’ trade period. In this centuries migration to Europe 
continued and the slaves were replaced by indentured workers (Stalker, 1994). This 
phenomenon was encouraged both by the need of obtaining the necessary work force and 
soldiers and the need of having new residents in the uncultivated lands. The need of work 
force and soldiers during these centuries was so big in many European countries that the 
governments had to take measures to limit migration. One example of these measures was the 
Alien Bill that was introduced in England in 1793 with the aim of controlling immigration 
(Rystad, 1992). Nowadays these kinds of measures are the rule and not the exception.  
 
There are a lot of differences between past immigration and actual immigration and the two 
most important are related to the types of immigrants and the destination place. There are four 
main groups in which immigrants can be divided: permanent residents, temporary workers, 
refugees and illegal immigrants. The past international migrations were characterized by 
permanent residents while the nowadays are based mostly on the other three remaining 
groups. This is since laws have changed in time and now immigrants’ first need to enter on 
temporary visas and only later they can gain permanent residence.  
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The eighteenth and nineteenth century were characterized by migration from richer to poorer 
countries while current migration waves are the opposite from less developed countries and 
regions to those highly developed.  
 
Stage four was the migration of Europeans in other non-European countries. It took place 
between the mid-1800s and World War 1. There was a period of free migration with no 
controls over population movements because of the expansion of liberalism and the Industrial 
Revolution. Millions of Europeans moved voluntary, as the process of industrialization and 
agricultural transformation created surplus in the countryside and generated new work force 
in the cities (Wells, 1996). Migrants could find work closer to their home or far away in the 
new world colonies (Americans, Australia and New Zealand). European population started to 
increase significantly due to a low death rate and a high birth rate and the need to migrate was 
very high. Estimates show that more than 2 million of Europeans, decided to migrate in North 
America. The British Isles were the greatest source with 1.75 million individuals, 
approximately 25000 individuals were from France, 100.000 were from Germany and a few 
hundred thousand arrived from Spain (Böhning, 1978). 
 
Between the two World Wars migration decreased significantly because of new international 
immigration controls. After World War one trust in people was vanishing and free movement 
of individuals with no documents was forbidden. Passport became a good instrument to 
restrict and control migration at the borders. European countries had a serious problem of 
unemployment and there was the need to protect domestic workers against foreign 
competition so migration felt even more.  
 
Stage five consisted in the migration of Europeans and non-European to Europe. It began after 
1945 when migration started to increase again thanks to the application of measures of 
relatively liberal immigration. The Cold War was also a fundamental component because 
many people wanted to pass the Iron Curtain and to migrate from East Germany to West and 
from Eastern Europe to Western Europe to search better conditions. Migration was favored 
also by the high demand of labor force especially in the industrialized Western European 
countries which often resulted in the employment of foreign workers. Germany’s economy in 
those years started to recover quickly and the demand for labor could no longer be satisfied 
domestically. The German government applied the guest-worker policies which consist in the 
acceptance and employment of immigrants as long as there were jobs for them. Once the 
economy was fully recovered all these individuals were obliged to return to the country of 
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origin. Germany had no colonies and the only way to obtain migrant labor was to enter in 
bilateral guest worker agreements with other countries. This policy appeared to work until 
1970 when the number of immigrants started to increase even when the economy was slowing 
and in 1973 Germany decided to issue a migration stop. Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, United Kingdom and France adopted variants of this guest-
worker policy and all decided to stop it in 1973 and to reduce labor migration (Rendall, 2004).  
 
The problem with this policy was that the governments started to give citizenships to all 
migrants that came from colonies. Colonial migrants entered in the European countries as 
citizens, and as such claimed a right to family reunification. In adding young men in the 
1950s and 1960s, European states committed themselves to admitting wives, children and 
sometimes grandparents later. At the same time, in the medium-term migrants almost always 
have a higher birth rate than the natives and because of both, for every nation in Europe, there 
was the creation of multicultural, multilingual societies.  
 
In 1973 with the oil crisis European countries entered a deep recession which caused 
unemployment and a dramatic reduction of immigration. The years from 1973 to 1985 were 
characterized by rigorous immigration control. Labor force immigration has ended in all 
countries in Europe, except for some illegal aliens and a certain number of seasonal workers.  
 
The period after 1985 was characterized by an intensification of migratory movements of 
illegal immigrants and asylum seekers coming from the Third World, especially from Asia. 
The intensification of migration happened because of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of 
the transportation costs. Between 1989 and 1992 the total applications of asylum seekers 
doubled, from 320.000 to 695.000 (Randan Hansen, 2000) and until the end of the decade it 
reached 455.000.  
 
In Europe the role of borders and frontiers begins to be even more interesting from the 2000s. 
The removal of frontiers within the European Union facilitated the mobility across the states 
of the Union and created the condition for new dynamics of movement.  
There was a rise in cross-border shuttle migration across the eastern frontier of the EU and a 
sharp increase in the “phenomenon” of illegal or irregular migration. More than 500.000 
foreigners entered in Europe clandestinely only in the first years of 2000s.  
 
The main reasons for this phenomenon were: a strong push factors that operated from the 
countries of origin and a harsh regimes of immigration control imposed by West European 
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states, including more rigid mechanistic processing of asylum-seekers claims for refugee 
status and stricter criteria (Russell King, 2002).  
 
In 2002 the most important destination country for intra-European migration was Germany 
with over 344.000 immigrants. The main sources of migrants to Germany were: Poland, 
Russian Federation, Turkey, Italy, Romania and France. The second biggest actor in European 
migration was the United Kingdom, with nearly 105.000 immigrants only from other 
European countries. The biggest population inflow was from Australia, France, Germany and 
the United States. The third actor was Spain with more than 489,000 immigrants in 2002. 
Only 153,000 migrants (32% of total) were originated from European countries, while the 
other 68% came mainly from Latin American and North African countries. Globally, the most 
important source countries of migrants to Spain were Ecuador, Argentina and Romania.  
 
In 2014 illegal immigration increased dramatically in comparison with the previous years. 
Following the Central Mediterranean, Western Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean routes, 
about 283,532 immigrants entered illegally in the European Union. Half of them had come 
from Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan. In figure 4 are summarized the total number of illegal 
immigrants that arrived in Europe from 2009 to 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: percentage of illegal immigrants in Europe in 2014 (Source: European Parliament Research Service) 
 
In 2014 it was registered also the highest number of asylum applications (620.000) since 
1992. The main countries of origin of asylum seekers, were Syria (20%), Afghanistan (7%), 
Kosovo (6%), Eritrea (6%) and Serbia (5%) and the states that received around two thirds of 
the EU’s asylum applications were Germany, Sweden, Italy and France.  
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Figure 5: Annual number of asylum applications received by EU-28 countries, Norway and Switzerland, 1985 to 2015 
(Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Eurostat data, June 22, 2016) 
 
In 2015 the number of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants surged to a new record.  
More than 1 million immigrants entered in Europe. The 58% were adult males over 18 years 
of age, 17% were adult females over 18 years of age, and 25% were minor males and minor 
females under 18 years of age. 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: Migrants detected to 
enter EU illegally in 2014-2015 
(Source: Frontex) 
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Most of them choose to travel by land and Map1 puts in evidence that the principals’ routes of 
illegal entries were Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes.  
Additionally, in 2015 the highest number of first time applicants was registered in Germany, 
35% of total applications in EU (441,800 applicants) followed by Hungary 14% (174,400 
applicants), Sweden 12% (156,100 applicants), Austria 7%  (85,500 applicants), Italy 7% 
(83,200 applicants) and France 6% (70,600 applicants). Compared with the population 
number the highest number of immigrants that crossed the borders to asked asylum was in 
Hungary (1800 refugees per 100.000 residents), Sweden (1600 refugees per 100.000 
residents), Austria (1000 refugees per 100.000 residents) and Germany (only 587 applications 
for every 100.000 residents).  
 
 The main sources of immigration in 2015 were: Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The conflict in 
Syria is still the main driver of migration in Europe. The second driver is the ongoing 
violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo that is leading people to look for new lives 
elsewhere.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Top 10 origins of people that applied for asylum in EU in 2015 (in Thousands) (Source: Eurostat) 
 
 
In these last two years’ tensions in the EU have been rising because of the disproportionate 
burden faced by some countries, particularly the countries where the majority of migrants 
have been arriving: Greece, Italy and Hungary. The EU requires that asylum petition be 
processed by the country in which migrants first arrive. Because of this legislation countries 
near the principal migration routes like Hungary, Italy and Greece find themselves more 
affected by these last migration waves than the richer northern countries.  
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Taking in refugees is not cheap; Italy in 2015 spent more than $9.7 million a month only to 
sustain a program to find and rescue migrants’ ships. Turkey spent more than $4.5 billion to 
guarantee the access to immigrants to basic services like health care and education. The cost 
of taking in migrants is not measured only in dollars but also in anti-immigrants’ attitudes that 
in the last year have risen across the continent. The increase of these sentiments has pushed 
right parties to the political forefront and gave them a larger role in the countries’ politics in 
the years to come.  If high-unemployment persists in Europe, immigration policy will 
continue to be driven by the rising in anti-immigration sentiments.  
 
In 2016 the number of illegal migrants and asylum seekers reaching Europe, fell sharply in 
almost all the routes. The biggest part of immigrants that arrived were coming from Syria 
(23%), Afghanistan (12%) and Nigeria (10%).  
 
Figure 7: Main countries of origin in 2016 (Source: The UN Refugee agency) 
 
From the total number of immigrants only the 3% (34,215) came by land to Bulgaria and 
Greece. All the rest came by sea to Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Malta. The majority 
arrived by sea in Greece (816,752) and Italy (150,317)  
 
In 2016 compared to 2015 the number of illegal immigrants detected only on Greece’s islands 
dropped by 79% in large part due to the Eu/Turkey statement. This statement, from March 
2016 lead to an increase in the border controls by Turkish authorities and to readmission of 
immigrants from Greece to Turkey.  
 
The drop in the number of migrants in the Western Balkans route, from 764.000 in 2015 to 
123.000 in 2016, is due to both, an increase in the border controls and a range of measures 
implemented by the EU and countries.  
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In the other routes like the Western African there were detected only 580 illegal immigrants 
whereas in the Western Mediterranean the number reached 1.800. Only in the Central 
Mediterranean routes the number of illegal immigrants’ detected increase by one-fifth arriving 
to 181.000. This increase was caused by a strong migratory pressure from the African 
continent.  
 
 
Map 2: Main migratory routes in 2016 - The data presented refer to detections of illegal border-crossing rather than the 
number of persons, as the same person may cross the external border several times. (Source: Frontex)  
 
In total, in 2016, the number of estimated detections of illegal border crossing was 503 700.  
 
The number of asylum seekers in Eu-28 in the first six months increase by 17% with respect 
to the previous year but in the following months the number decrease by -15%. The total 
number of asylum applicants in 2016 were 370 700 and the major part of them 358 300 
(97 %) were first time applicants.  
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Figure 7: First time asylum applicants, EU-28 (Source: Eurostat) 
 
In conclusion, by looking at Europe’s history it can be observed that big waves of 
immigration have always existed but they’ve never been as immense and problematic as in 
the recent years. The measures that were applied to control for immigration and the European 
native’s opinion before this massive movements will be analyzed in the following Chapters of 
this work.  
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CHAPTER 2 – Migration Policies and Public Opinion 
 
 2.1 European migration policies  
 
From the conclusions of the previous Chapter it can be said that Europe has always been a 
continent loved by immigrants. The immigration flows have never stopped and in the last 
years we have seen that increased more and more. The European Union and its Member states  
have had to take a variety of measures to deal with this phenomenon that nowadays had 
become more problematic and immense than ever.  
 
The patterns of immigration are shaped by the government policy which attempt to control 
immigration flows in the national interest. The Governments, on the one hand must encourage 
immigrants to come because they represent a valuable labor force for the country, on the other 
hand must dissuade them because they bring social and political problems. The same dilemma 
is valid for the refugee’s. Governments would accept them as a response to a humanitarian 
impulse, but would also limit their entrance because of economic reasons and social stability.    
 
The Governments of the receiving countries must respond to pressure from both interest 
groups, the one in favor of immigration and the others in favor of stricter controls. The perfect 
example of this two groups can be found in the labor market: employers are in favor of 
immigration because gives them a large pool of potential employees whether employees are 
anti-immigration because immigrants who are prepared to accept lower wages would increase 
the level of competition. Only during times of economic expansions, like the Germany’s guest 
work policies, both employers and employees were in favor of immigration (Hollifield 1992). 
 
Western European governments, since the 1970s, have applied many laws to reduce or 
manage immigration and refugee flows. These laws have not yielded the desired result but 
have only made things worse by increasing the number of illegal immigrants and damaging 
genuine refugees. Later, new measure for the restriction of illegal immigration were adopted. 
This new measures have driven immigrants and refugees to use more dangerous routes to 
enter in Europe like the use of services of smuggling or trafficking networks. These restrictive 
migration policies have also increased the tension between natives and immigrants and have 
reduced the supply of workers to many sectors in need of labor (Boswell, 2003).  
 
Given the law impact of traditional migration control policies, west European States have 
looked for alternatives. They start to address migration management dilemmas through 
28 
 
cooperation with migrant-sending countries and the ‘transit’ countries through which migrants 
and refugees travel. 
 
From the mid-80s the countries of the EU became more concern about their common external 
frontier and started to develop a common policy on non-EU immigrants. This process pass 
through different stages summarized in the following Table 0.  
 
One of the most important stage is the Schengen Convention in 1990, which moved the EU 
closer to a borderless union and to common policies on asylum and immigration. The border 
controls between EU countries have been removed while the external frontiers have been 
strengthened.  
 
The Dublin Convention brought a change to the asylum seekers condition.  After 1997 the 
asylum seekers had to apply in the first EU country in which they land. This rule is still 
applied today and it brings a lot of problems to the European countries situated near the 
principal immigration routes.   
 
In 2001, during the meeting of the Council at Laeken the EU members decided to adopt a 
closer cooperation to protect external frontiers and reject the proposal to create a common 
European border guarded by EU border guards. European Governments preferred to adopt 
national policies to supranational ones.  
 
TABLE 0 – MIGRATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
Year Event Outcome 
 
 
1958 
 
 
Treaty of Rome 
 
Born the European Economic 
Community.  
It was established that citizens 
of member countries could 
travel to other member 
countries to search for work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1985 
 
 
 
 
 
Schengen Accords 
 
Agreement to remove all 
border controls and to 
strengthen the common 
external frontier.  
Originally signed by six 
countries in 1985. 
The current signatories are: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech 
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Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 
 
 
 
 
Treaty on EU 
 
 
The “Maastricht treaty” 
extended cooperation to 
political activities, including 
foreign policy.  
This treaty lifted the remaining 
restrictions on migration from 
Spain and Portugal to other EU 
countries 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
Dublin Convention 
 
Harmonize policy by requiring 
asylum seekers to apply in the 
first EU country, they enter. 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
 
 
Placed issues relating to 
immigration and asylum under 
the jurisdiction of the EC and 
incorporated the Schengen 
Accords into the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
European Council 
meeting in Tampere 
 
 
Established the need for a 
common European policy on 
asylum and immigration and 
asked the European 
Commission to draw up 
proposals on asylum, refugees, 
and immigration. 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
Nice Treaty 
 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
that says that non-EU nationals 
with residence or work permits 
should eventually have the 
same freedom of movement as 
EU nationals. 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
Principles with concrete actions 
for their implementation, based 
on which the common 
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Brussels - A Common 
Immigration Policy for Europe: 
Principles, actions and tools 
European immigration policy 
will be formulated. 
  
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
Lisbon Treaty 
 
Immigration policies must be 
governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including the 
financial implications, among 
all the Member States. 
  
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
The ‘Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility’ 
 
Established in the field of 
migration, the general 
framework for EU’s relations 
with third countries. 
 
 
 
 
2014 
  
Strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational 
planning within the area of 
freedom, security and justice” 
for the period 2014-2020 
 
 
These guidelines are 
concentrate on the need to 
adopt a universal approach to 
migration that should protect 
the regular migration and 
should fight irregular 
migration. 
 
 
 
 
2015 
 
 
 
European Agenda on Migration 
 
 
Instant measures to solve the 
immigration crisis in the 
Mediterranean and measures to 
be taken in the next years to 
manage immigration more 
effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
Communication of the 
European Commission entitled:  
“Towards a reform of the 
Common European asylum 
system and enhancing legal 
avenues to Europe”. 
 
 
Contains the guidelines of the 
Commission that are 
concentrated on four elements: 
the revision of the Blue Card 
Directive, the development of a 
new model for regular 
immigration, the attraction of 
new innovative entrepreneurs 
to EU and the strengthening of 
the cooperation with the 
countries of origin. 
 
 
The European Union and its Member States wanted to create a balanced approach to deal with 
regular immigration and to fight the irregular immigration. The EU’s aim was to establish a 
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uniform level of rights and obligations for regular immigrants, similar with the one for EU 
citizens. In 2008 the European Union decided to write down the principles for the 
implementation of a common immigration policy. This policy had to be transparent, clear, and 
fair and had to promote legal immigration. Its fundamental principles had to be: solidarity, 
security, mutual trust, transparence, responsibility and share effort between the EU and its 
countries. Immigration had to be considered as an integral part of the EU’s external policy 
and the collaboration on all aspects of migration had to be promoted also in all partnerships 
with non-EU countries. For the implementation of these policy in practice, the European 
Union had, first to define clear rules for the entrance and the residence of immigrants, then 
provide them the necessary information about their rights and obligations and finally had to 
work towards a flexible Europe-wide visa policy. 5 
 
In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty established the solidarity principle. Through this principle, it was 
made clear that the EU had to share competence with Member States regarding the decision of 
the numbers of immigrants to allow in the countries and the measures to adopt to reach a 
complete integration. This treaty established also that the immigration policies would try to 
stimulate progress, of all sectors and within all skills level, and would try to focus on the 
need-based assessment of EU labor markets.6 
 
In 2011 was adopted the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” which established in 
the field of migration, the general framework for EU’s relations with third countries. The 
framework defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with other non-
EU countries. The Global Approach main instruments are the “mobility partnerships” and the 
“Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility” (CAMM).  Both offer a political framework 
for comprehensive, dialogue and cooperation with partner countries and incorporate a set of 
measures like the measures on circular migration or the measures to fight irregular 
immigration. There are only two important differences between the two instruments. The first 
difference stays in the fact “Mobility partnerships” includes also the negotiation of visa 
facilitation and the readmission agreement, while the CAMM don’t. The second difference 
                                                          
 
5 Source: Nicholas Van Hear, Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, THE MIGRATIONDEVELOPMENT NEXUS, 
International Organization for Migration, 2003 
 
6 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017) 
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stays in their applications: “Mobility partnerships” is applied mostly to neighborhood 
countries whereas CAMM is applied to the other third countries. 
 
In 2014 the European Council defined the “Strategic guidelines for legislative and operational 
planning within the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2014-2020”. These 
guidelines are concentrate on the need to adopt a universal approach to migration that should 
protect the regular migration and should fight irregular migration.  
 
In 2015 was published “the European Agenda on Migration” that proposed instant measures 
to solve the immigration crisis in the Mediterranean and measures to be taken in the next 
years to manage immigration more effectively. The immediate measures were: the increase in 
resources available to both Frontex’s operations, Triton and Poseidon, the adoption of a 
temporary system for the distribution of asylum-seekers and the creation of a relocation 
program for the expatriate people who require international protection in Europe. These fast 
measures were adopted on September 2015 by the European Council.  
These long-term measures are mostly concentrate on reducing the incentives of irregular 
immigration, dismantling the smuggling networks, combating the trafficking in migrants, 
establishing a new policy on regular immigration, saving lives and securing the external 
borders, developing a common asylum policy and revising the blue-card system. 7 
 
In 2016 the European Commission, based on 2015 Agenda, published its guidelines in a 
communication entitled: “Towards a reform of the Common European asylum system and 
enhancing legal avenues to Europe”. These guidelines are concentrate on four elements: the 
revision of the Blue Card Directive, the development of a new model for regular immigration, 
the attraction of new innovative entrepreneurs to EU and the strengthening of the cooperation 
with the countries of origin. 8 
 
To deal with the recent immigration crisis many European directives on immigration and 
asylum have been adopted. The directives were applied to the three principal problems: 
regular immigration, irregular immigration and integration of immigrants.  
 
                                                          
 
 
7 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017) 
 
8 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017) 
 
33 
 
Regular immigration: was not possible to adopt a general rule that could cover all labor 
immigration, so it was decided to adopt a sectorial legislation divided by category of 
immigrants to establish EU immigration policy.  
 
1) Directive 2009/50/EC: was implemented in 2014 and had the purpose to create the EU 
blue card. This card enables third country qualified workers to find qualified 
employment in all Member States.  
 
2) The Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU): the first report on its implementation is 
due by December 2016. This directive has the purpose to create a common set of 
rights to be granted to regular immigrants. 
 
3) Directive 2014/36/EU: was adopted in 2014 and has the objective to regulate the 
conditions regarding the entry, the residence and the rights of third-country seasonal 
workers. The period of stay in EU is different in each Member State but in all goes 
around five and nine months 
 
4) Directive 2014/66/EU: was adopted in 2014 and has the objective to regulate the entry 
and residence of third-country workers in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer.  
 
5) Directive 2016/801/EU: was adopted in 2016 and its target is the regulation of the 
entry of third-country nationals for studying or research reasons. 9 
 
Irregular immigration: 
 
1) The “Return Directive” (2008/115/EC): was implemented in 2014 and laid down 
standards and procedures to return to their original country the irregular immigrants.  
 
2) Directive 2009/52/EC: was implemented in 2014 ad contains sanctions and measures 
to be applied in all Member States against employers who employ illegal third country 
national’s residents.  
 
                                                          
 
 
9 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017) 
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3) In 2016 was signed an agreement between Turkey and EU that included plans for the 
repatriation to Turkey of all irregular immigrants that arrived in Greece from March 
2016.  
 
4) Other measures to be concluded are the measures of cooperation to fight the 
trafficking in human beings. 10 
 
Immigrants’ integrations:  
 
1) Directive 2003/86/EC: adopted to set up the rules for the right to family reunification. 
In 2014 the Commission published a communication that contained the guidelines for 
the Member States on how to apply this directive.  
 
2) European Agenda for the Integration of Third-country Nationals was adopted only in 
2011. Since 2011 other two instruments have been created to deal with the same issue: 
The European integration forum that in 2015 was transformed into “The European 
Migration forum” and “the European Website on integration”.  
 
3) In 2016 the European Commission adopted a policy with practical steps to help 20 
million non-EU nationals legally resident in EU Member States to integrate. 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
10 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2017) 
 
11 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017) 
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2.2.1 National polices on immigration 
 
At the national level the current trend seem to be for governments to try to manage 
immigration more efficiently. National policies on immigration involve hard work in: 
deciding the admission rates for the regular immigrants that are coming from the third 
countries to seek work, promoting the integration of legally resident third-country nationals 
and combating illegal immigration by giving sanctions to airlines and other travel operators or 
to employers of illegal immigrants. The European Union instead must: decide the conditions 
for both, the legal entry and residence in Member States and for family reunification, support 
the measures taken by the Member States to promote integrations, reduce and prevent 
irregular immigration and conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of 
their country of origin nationals. 12 
 
The following are some measures that were taken by individual countries to control the 
currently immigration crisis: 
 
1) 2016 - Sweden13: adopted a new law to limit the asylum seekers’ possibilities to be 
granted residence permits (only for three years) and being reunited with their families. 
Family reunification will be given only: if is given the refugee status and a residence 
permit for three years, if both partners have more than 21 years and have lived 
together before moving to Sweden and if the refugee is able to maintain himself and 
his family members that want to move to Sweden.  
 
2) 2016 - Austria: adopted new laws to restrict the right of asylum (in 2016 only 37.500 
individuals could apply for asylum). These new laws were adopted in response to the 
migrant crisis and allows Austria’s government to declare a state emergency over 
migration and to turn away immigrants at the border (Christa Pongratz-Lippitt, The 
Guardian).  
 
                                                          
 
 
12 Source: European Parliament (Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2017) 
 
13 Source: Swedish Migration Agency 
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3) 2016 - Great Britain: after Brexit, the UK introduced the Immigration Act 2016, that 
will sanction all illegal workers and employers that will give work to illegal 
individuals, prevent illegal migrants from accessing housing, driving license and bank 
accounts and new measure to enforce immigration law and to remove all illegal 
immigrants. The new legislation applies stricter immigration rules also for working 
people. People coming from outside the European Union that have been working in 
the UK for more than five years and earn less than £35,000 a year, will be shipped off 
back to the country of origin (Broomfield, The Independent).  
 
4) 2016 – France14 : adopted a new law that will affect both foreign going to France and 
that are already living in France. The new law introduces the “multiannual residence 
permit”, in which are nowadays included the EU Blue card holders and the intra-
company transferees, also to other categories of foreigners like the seasonal workers. 
The new residence permit category is called “passport talent” and it will be given only 
to high qualified workers, researchers, local representatives of a company established 
in France, foreigners investor that want to create a company in France, foreigners 
employed in France who hold a French Mater degree and intra company transferees 
hired in France. This residence permit is valid only for four years.  
 
5) 2016 – Hungary: in October, held a referendum related to the European Union's 
migrant relocation plans. The referendum was initiated by the government which spent 
at least $ 36 million for its realization. The turnover was only 43%, below to the 
required quota for a referendum to be considered valid under the Hungarian law. The 
98% of the total voters had chosen to refuse to allow the EU to force the country to 
accept more refugees (Lyman, The New York Times).  
 
6) 2016 – Italy: new laws regarding citizenship and migration legislation. Italy updated 
its legislation in accordance with the EU Directives on international protection. 
Applicants for international protection are divided in refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection. Both groups from now on will have an extended residence 
                                                          
 
14 Source: The French law resource 
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permits, new rights for family reunification and better access to social assistance, 
housing education and healthcare services. 15 
 
7) 2016 – Greece: Eu/Turkey statement that allows Greek Government to send back to 
Turkey all the asylum seekers who use illegal routes from to reach the Greek island 
form Turkey. Turkey received about $6.6 billions from the EU to help the immigrants 
there. The number of illegal immigrants decreased dramatically (Chan, The New York 
Times).  
 
8) 2016 – Germany: is the only continues in Europe that continue its policy of open-
arms. 
 Angela Merkel during the annual summer press conference in Berlin on July 28 said:  
"We are doing everything humanly possible to ensure security in Germany, 
Anxiety and fear cannot guide our political decisions."16 
 
In 2016, Germany implemented new measures to facilitate the integration of 
immigrants into society and into the workforce. These new measures provide the cut 
of the support for the asylum seekers that will reject the mandatory integration 
measures such as language classes, cultural basics and lessons in German law. 
(Oltermann, The Guardian). The suspension for three years of the law that required 
employers to give preference to German and EU job applicants over asylum seekers.  
Other measure include the addition on the list of safe countries of: Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
15 Source: European Commission 
 
16 Source: Gatestone Institute – Internatinal Policy Council 
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2.2 Public opinion  
 
Since 2015 the Western society has come across a shift in politics. The leftist multiculturalism 
and the globalization process have been turned down by the outcome of the Brexit vote and 
the U.S. Presidential election. The post-Financial Crisis decade has hit Europe with the 
sovereign debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and is culminating now in a loss of faith in the 
European project and a return to strong nationalism.  
 
With the beginning of the 2015’s migrant crisis, the nationalist right-wing movements and the 
so called “populist” movements are getting more and more popular among voters. Especially 
in countries such as Austria and Hungary, where religious beliefs still have a very relevant 
cultural grasp on the population. But also in more religious diverse and secular countries such 
Germany and France, the “xenophobic” and nationalistic sentiment is increasing (Natalia 
Banulescu-Bogdan, Migration policy institute, 2016). 
Also some more aspects of the problem need to be addressed to build a full picture: the 
mainstream media coverage, the far-right fringe, and the geo-political situation in the Middle 
East.  
 
The media coverage has been focusing on the “dramatic impact” of the phenomenon, 
reporting and covering the most extreme stories about the migrant situation such as the tragic 
deaths occurred during the migrations, and the personal struggles of real families or war 
refugees caught up the stream of economic and welfare migrants. The humanitarianistic 
approach of the media summed itself up with a similar feeling in some part of the population. 
Movement such as the feminists, the LGTB community and part of the leftist voters, have 
been in support of welcoming anyone in the mixed influx in violation of national immigration 
laws. The media approach on reporting the phenomenon however diverge with the data and 
the daily experiences that people in Europe had to face. As a matter of fact, “no-go zones” in 
European countries such as France, Sweden, and now Germany are growing in numbers. 
These areas are actually becoming ghettos for the migrants, where the national law is no 
longer enforced.  Actual crime rates have been increasing dramatically after the open border 
policies, with Oslo becoming the rape capital of Europe.  
 
These various “progressive” policies about immigration have had a serious impact on the 
public opinion. The most significant being the “Merkel’s invitation” of migrants to the west, 
that still represents the apparent trigger of the migrant influxes (The Guardian 2016). 
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The media coverage, together with the evolution of the internet and telecommunications, 
created room for alternative media and social networks, which became a source of 
information perceived as more direct and complete. The downside being that alternative 
media and social networks are less professional in reporting news, and not as objective as 
professional news should be in principle. Such aspect might cause a misinterpretation in 
actual data with the result of blowing the problem out of proportion and creating resonance 
chambers that the population might use not to get objectively informed, but rather to vent up 
frustration and find confirmation for their fears and worries.  
 
The far-right borders come in the picture as a political backlash to the European left. From an 
economic perspective, the last decade kept on the globalist trend of overall growth with 
raising inequalities inside nation states (Jay Mazur, 2000), especially in the west where the 
income of the middle class has been shrinking in the past decade. Many reasons can be 
pointed to explain the trend: from the externalization of west industry to the developing 
countries, which took jobs and incomes away from the west; to the austerity measures that 
many European countries had to follow, especially in southern Europe, that lead to a raise in 
fiscal pressure. 
 
 In light of this data, the repercussion on votes, and the need for nationalism and conservatism 
politics comes as no surprise. Moreover, in these times of economic strife, multiculturalism, 
integration, tolerance and open border policies are seen more as a threat, if not a main cause, 
for the economic well-being of the middle class.   
 
It’s not illogic to assume that cultural and political crisis and economic difficulties, go hand in 
hand, and since the response of the moderate right Europe is not perceived as impactful or 
effective by the population, the extreme fringes become a possible choice. This particular 
situation however, can find justification in what has become known in politics as “populism”, 
namely the attitude of a politician to pursue policies that are perceived as “demanded” by the 
voters. The term has been used in politics and debates as an accusation between political 
parties. However, from a pure logic perspective making such accusation upon another 
politician must imply that the one in charge knows how to act in the best interest of the 
population, regardless of their own opinion. An argument could be made to show that it is true 
in practice, but it is in principle a violation of the democratic system. 
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This whole anti-democratic position of the European left, lead movements such Le Pen’s in 
France, and the Brexit’s one in Britain to gain more and more popularity, by simply 
promising to do, as a government, what part of the population demands.  
  
The geopolitical situation in the Middle East is the last aspect of the problem. It also is the 
more obscure and complex, and the one upon which both the government and the European 
population have less power and leverage. The war in Syria and the whole geopolitical 
situation features as main actors, the local countries and factions, the United States 
government and the Russian Federation. On one hand the political and economic interests of 
the US government in the region caused all-out wars in some countries like Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and helped cause more upraising and instability in other ones such as: Syria and 
Pakistan. The Russian Federation also participated in the competition for regional resources 
and political influence with the forced annexation of Crimea, which gave the country a more 
direct access on the region, and by directly aiding the Syrian government against the local 
rebel faction. 
As a result, Turkey became both a gateway to Europe for the migrant influx and a player in 
the complex political situation. The Ankara’s government didn’t hesitate to use its role as a 
“gate for migrants” to gain leverage on the European Union. 
 
In conclusion, migrant fluxes and unregulated immigration caused by regional instability in 
the middle east, and used as a political tool, both by the European left and the involved 
governments, in a biased and non-objective media coverage with a “chamber of resonance” 
effect, can only lead to the failed multiculturalism and poor integration that the population of 
Europe are witnessing across the continent. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Empirical analysis 
 
3.1 Database Description 
 
The purpose of this analysis consists in studying what were the opinions of the European 
natives on immigration before these two last big waves of immigration had hit Europe. 
 
The information needed was taken from the data set “ESS7-2014 Edition” realized by the 
European Social Survey on 26 May 2016.  
For each individual, this data set contains socio-economic and demographic information and a 
variety of opinions on topics such as immigration, patriotism and political affiliation.  
The variables useful for this study were 30 and the total observations were 33.900.  
 
The most important variable from the entire data set is “Born in country”. It was used to 
divide native answers from the total answers.  
 
Native is defined as a person who was born in a specific place or associated with a place by 
birth, whether resident there or not.   
 
In this case, to separate native answers from immigrants’ answers, only the “Yes” answers to 
the question “Were you born in country?” were considered.  
 
The original database collects answers from 21 European countries. The countries are: 
Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Israel and Ireland.  
Israel is the only country that was eliminated from the original data set because is not part of 
Europe so was not considered useful for the study. 
 
In Table1 are evidenced the density of responses for each country. Germany is the country 
with the highest number of responses followed by Lithuania with 2175 responses, Czech 
Republic with more than 2100 responses, Ireland with a total of 2075 responses and Finland 
with more than 1980 responses.  
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TABLE 1 – Density of responses for each country 
 
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
AT 1,584 4.67 4.67 
BE 1,542 4.55 9.22 
CH 1,139 3.36 12.58 
CZ 2,102 6.20 18.78 
DE 2,745 8.10 26.88 
DK 1,382 4.08 30.96 
EE 1,649 4.86 35.82 
ES 1,756 5.18 41.00 
FI 1,987 5.86 46.86 
FR 1,694 5.00 51.86 
GB 1,950 5.75 57.61 
HU 1,671 4.93 62.54 
IE 2,075 6.12 68.66 
LT 2,175 6.42 75.08 
NL 1,736 5.12 80.20 
NO 1,267 3.74 83.94 
PL 1,598 4.71 88.65 
PT 1,170 3.45 92.10 
SE 1,554 4.58 96.68 
SI 1,124 3.32 100.00 
                                                                           Total     33,900     100.00 
 
 
The demographic and socio-economic variables examined were: age, gender, religion, 
citizenship, education and employment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Density of the age of respondents 
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The data set is composed by 47% male and 53% female with an age between 14 and 104 
years old. The average age of the respondents is around 50 which means that most people that 
responded to the questionnaire were adults and old people between 30 and 70 years old.  
There was a small section of individuals (0.17% for age and 0.06 for gender) that gave NA 
responses which were coded as missing values for both variables. 
 
The 46% of the total individuals that answered to the questionnaire were Atheist, 34% were 
Roman Catholic, 15% were Protestants and the rest 0.4% were Eastern Orthodox or Jewish or 
Islamic or Other religions. Also in this case the 0.97% of the total answers were “Refusal” or 
NA which were coded as missing values. 
 
 
 
Graph 2 – Distribution of religion across the population 
 
Citizenship is a variable that must be analyze carefully because the European countries have 
no single way to give citizenship to migrants. Many of them use the "ius sanguinis" criteria 
which mean that persons can have the citizenship of the country only if they have one straight 
relative which already hold it. Citizenship can be acquired also with marriage or with long 
residence in that country. The U.S is the only state that follows the "ius soli" criteria which 
mean that you can have the citizenship of the country if you were born there. The European 
Roman Catholic Protestant
Eastern Orthodox Other Christian denomination
Jewish Islamic
Eastern religions Other non-Christian religions
Atheist
34 % 46% 
15 % 
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countries follow these criteria too, but with some restrictions, for example Spain gives 
citizenship if and only if one person and one of his straight relatives were born there.   
 
 
TABLE 2 – Distribution of citizenship across the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be concluded, from the analysis of the variable “Citizenship”, that 99, 4% of individual 
that participated to the study possessed the citizenship of the country where the questionnaire 
was applied.  
Citizenship Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
AT 1 0.00 0.00 
BA 2 0.01 0.01 
BE 1 0.00 0.01 
CA 1 0.00 0.01 
CH 1 0.00 0.02 
Citizens 33,595 99.45 99.47 
DE 8 0.02 99.49 
DK 2 0.01 99.50 
DZ 1 0.00 99.50 
ES 7 0.02 99.52 
FI 2 0.01 99.53 
FR 3 0.01 99.54 
GB 2 0.01 99.54 
GR 2 0.01 99.55 
HR 8 0.02 99.57 
IE 1 0.00 99.58 
IO 1 0.00 99.58 
IS 1 0.00 99.58 
IT 30 0.09 99.67 
LT 1 0.00 99.67 
MA 3 0.01 99.68 
MK 2 0.01 99.69 
MX 1 0.00 99.69 
NL 4 0.01 99.70 
NO 4 0.01 99.72 
PL 1 0.00 99.72 
PT 9 0.03 99.75 
RO 1 0.00 99.75 
RS 3 0.01 99.76 
RU 64 0.19 99.95 
SK 1 0.00 99.95 
TH 1 0.00 99.95 
TR 13 0.04 99.99 
UA 1 0.00 99.99 
XK 2 0.01 100.00 
    
Total 33,780 100.00  
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The other citizenships that individuals possessed are more than 20, European and non-
European. The major European ones, different from the ones where the questionnaire was 
applied were Russian, Italian, Croatian, Spanish whereas the non-European were Turkish, 
Mexican and Canadian. 
The variable citizenship was finally transformed into a dummy because for this study it counts 
only the impact that the characteristic of being citizen of one country has on the pro- 
immigration attitudes.  
 
 
The first socio-economic variable education was recoded. The original education variable 
used the UNESCO’s ISCED classification (International Standard Classification of 
Education).  
To make the analysis simpler, this variable was recoded into a more basically system of 
education with only 4 levels: primary, secondary, tertiary and others. Primary education was 
not modified and remained ISCED 1. At the secondary level of education was assigned 
ISCED 2, ISCED 3a and ISCED 3b and ISCED 4 and at the tertiary level of education was 
assigned ISCED V1 and ISCED V2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph3: Education Level distribution across the sample 
 
 
primary educ secondary educ
tertiary educ Other
10.2 % 21.7% 
% 
0.26 % 
% 
67.7 % 
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Graph3 summarize the distribution of the education level across the sample and it can be 
notice that most the respondents have completed the secondary level of education (67, 7), and 
only a small percentage stopped at the primary (10.2%). Tertiary education was completed by 
21% of the sample population and the other types of education were concluded only by 0.26% 
of the rest of the population.  
 
The last socio-economic variable, in Graph 4, illustrates the main working relation of each 
responded in the sample. The 90% of the respondents were “employee” or “self-employed”, 
1, 7% were “working for own family business” and only 7, 9% were “unemployed”.  
 
For the variable “education” there was a 0.20% of the population that gave NA responses, 
while for the variable “employment” the population increased to 0.35%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph4: Employment relation distribution across sample 
 
 
The other variables of the data set cover a variety of opinions on topics such as immigration, 
characteristics that immigrants should possess, patriotism and political affiliation which can 
be categorized in 4 macro groups:  
 
Group 1 incorporates two variables fundamental for the study. Through the first variable is 
possible to comprehend whether the feeling of immigrants’ refusal comes from the strong 
feeling of nationalism or from other reasons. Through the second variable is possible to 
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realize how this feeling is reflected in the political choices of each state. These peculiarities 
will be analyzed in the next section of this work with the econometrics models. 
 
The feeling of nationalism can be quantified for each respondent through the question “How 
close do you feel to your country?” 
A small percentage of respondents (0.60%) gave NA responses that were coded as missing 
values. The other possible answers were: “1 - very close”, “2 - close”, “3 - not very close” and 
“4 - not close at all”.  
 
 
TABLE 3– Distribution of nationalism feelings across the sample 
Feel close to country Frequencies Percentage 
Very close     
         
Close      
 
Not very close  
 
Not close at all  
17,342 
 
13,482 
 
2,503 
 
377 
 
51.45        
 
40.00 
 
7.43 
 
1.12 
 
Total  33,704 100 
 
 
Table 3 contains the specific answers for all the categories. More than half of the population 
felt very close to their country, 40% of them felt close to their country, and only a small 
percentage felt not very close or not close at all.   
To get a more radical result the original variable was transformed into a dummy where 1 
stands for “feel very close” and 0 stands for “feel not close at all”. The sub-category “close” 
was added to “feel very close” and the other sub-category “not very close” was added to “not 
close at all”.  
 
From a short analysis appears that 91% of the individuals from the sample felt very close to 
their country and were very nationalists, while only a small percentage of them did not care at 
all about their country. At this level of analysis, it cannot be prove that this is one of the 
principal causes of immigrants’ refusal but it can be affirmed with certainty that is a big 
contribute in the stimulation of this feeling.  
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To understand why certain economic decisions like the reduction of immigrants are taken is 
important to know the composition of the government of one country.  The government 
reflects citizens' political choices during the elections. To appreciate these political choices, it 
was asked responses to specify their political alignment. The possible responses were reported 
in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 represent the left and 10 represent the right. 
 
The 10.55% of the sample population gave NA responses that were coded as missing values. 
Most the answers are located in the grades from 1 to 5 and the mean of the total answer is 5 
which indicates that the majority of the population would place themselves between left and 
right.  
 
 
 
TABLE 4– Frequencies of the answers of politics affiliations 
 
Placement on left- right scale Freq. Percent 
0 - Left 1,050 3.46 
1 680 2.24 
2 1,728 5.70 
3 3,240 10.69 
4 3,051 10.06 
5 9,935 32.77 
6 3,168 10.45 
7 3,332 10.99 
8 2,461 8.12 
9 717 2.36 
10 - Right 958 3.16 
   
Total 30,320 100.00 
 
 
To get a more drastic result also in this case the original variable was transformed into a 
dummy where 1 stands for affiliation with “extreme right parties” and 0 stands for affiliation 
with the “left parties”. The sub-categories “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7” were added to “left” while 
the others sub-categories “8 and 9” were added to “right”.  
From the analysis of the variable it seemed that the majority, 86% of the population, placed 
themselves into the left parties while only 13% choose the extreme right.  
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Group 2 embodies four variables that describe four important characteristics that immigrants 
should have according to natives. These characteristics are: be white, have a good education 
qualification, have the necessary work skill and have Christian backgrounds.  
The possible responses have been reported in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0 stands 
for “Extremely unimportant” and 10 stands for “Extremely important”.  
 
For each of the three variables a small percentage (1.3% for good education, 1.8% for 
Christian background and 1.4% for be white and 1.07% for needed working skills) of 
population gave NA responses that were coded as missing values.  
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Characteristics that immigrants should possess, according to natives (all grades) 
 
 
 
 
Before transforming the variables into dummies is important to highlight the original 
responses of the individuals of the sample. In Table 5 are summarized all these answers. For 
both the variables “good educational qualifications” and “work skills needed in country”, the 
majority of the responses are above the 5th grade and the means are both around 6 whereas 
 Good educational 
qualifications 
Christian  
Background 
 
 
Be whine 
Possess the work skill 
needed in country 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
0 -
Extremely 
unimportant 
1,588 4.75 10,739 32.25 15,474 46.30 1,820 5.43 
1 591 1.77 2,190 6.58 2,583 7.73 566 1.69 
2 1,221 3.65 2,997 9.00 2,754 8.24 1,073 3.20 
3 1,756 5.25 2,710 8.14 2,129 6.37 1,290 3.85 
4 1,763 5.27 2,000 6.01 1,483 4.44 1,349 4.02 
5 5,325 15.91 4,656 13.98 3,525 10.55 4,021 11.99 
6 3,783 11.30 1,817 5.46 1,302 3.90 3,297 9.83 
7 5,429 16.22 1,995 5.99 1,303 3.90 5,206 15.52 
8 5,917 17.68 1,895 5.69 1,181 3.53 6,464 19.27 
9 2,446 7.31 911 2.74 576 1.72 3,299 9.84 
10 – 
Extremely 
important 
3,647 10.90 1,387 4.17 1,114 3.33 5,152 15.36 
Total  33,466 100 33.297 100 33,424 100 33,537 100 
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for both the variables “Christian Background” and “be white” is the contrary and both means 
are around 2.5-3 grade.  
 
To see a more specific effect all the variables were transformed into dummies where 1 stands 
for “Extremely important” and 0 stands for “Extremely unimportant”. The sub-categories “2, 
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7”, for all the three variables, were added to “Extremely unimportant” while the 
others sub-categories “8 and 9” were added to “Extremely important”.  
 
 
TABLE 6: Characteristics that immigrants should possess, according to natives (only 
extremely important and unimportant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of these three variables as dummies shows the same results as before. Natives in 
deciding whether to accept immigrants did not consider important both, skin color (91.40%) 
and religion (87.40%). The characteristics that mattered for natives was a “good educational 
qualification” (36%) and “work skill needed in country” (44.4%). More than half of the 
natives that considered education and work skills fundamental were originally from Germany, 
Lithuania, Austria, Great Britain and Estonia.    
 
Group 3 contains variables that describe the impact of migration on the native lives.  
The most important impact is the economic one and can be observed by looking at the 
answers of the questions: “immigration bad/good for country's economy?”, “immigrants take 
out more than they put in or less in taxes and services?” and “immigrants take/create jobs?” 
The NA responses for the first variable were 3.33%, for the second variable were 5.19% and 
for the third variable were 3.19%. 
 
 Good educational 
qualifications 
Christian  
Background 
 
 
Be whine 
Possess the work skill 
needed in country 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Extremely 
unimportant 
21,456 64.11 29,104  87.41 30,553  91.41 18,622  55.53 
Extremely 
important 
12,010 35.89 4,193  12.59 2,871  8.59 14,915  44.47 
Total  33,466 100 33.297 100 33,424 100 33,537 100 
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 In the original database, all these questions have as answers a scale of grades from 0 to 10 
where 0 stands for “negative effect” and 10 stands for “positive effect”. 
 
TABLE 7a – Economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
Immigration bad/good for 
country’s economy 
Freq. Percent 
0 – Bad for the economy 2,040 6.23 
1 1,236 3.77 
2 2,498 7.62 
3 3,389 10.34 
4 3,227 9.85 
5 7,998 24.41 
6 3,715 11.34 
7 4,169 12.72 
8 2,926 8.93 
9 772 2.36 
10 – Good for the economy 799 2.44 
Total 32,769 100 
 
 
TABLE 7b – Economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
Immigrants take out more services  
than they put with takes 
Freq. Percent 
0 – Generally take out more 2,006 6.24 
1 1,361 4.23 
2 2,900 9.02 
3 4,120 12.82 
4 3,805 11.84 
5 10,193 31.71 
6 2,769 8.62 
7 2,602 8.10 
8 1,579 4.91 
9 369 1.15 
10 – Generally put in more 437 1.36 
Total 32,141 100 
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TABLE 7c – Economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
Immigrants take/ create new jobs Freq. Percent 
0 – Take jobs away 2,224 6.78 
1 1,219 3.71 
2 2,245 6.84 
3 3,164 9.64 
4 3,096 9.43 
5 10,319 31.44 
6 3,527 10.75 
7 3,533 10.76 
8 2,249 6.85 
9 612 1.86 
10 – Create new jobs 633 1.93 
Total 32,821 100 
 
For the three variables “bad for the economy”, “Take out more” and “Take jobs away” the 
responses are all concentrated between 0 and 8 and the grade with the major answers is the 
5th.  
 
The non-economic impact is highlighted through the questions: “Immigrants make country 
better/worse place to live?”, “country’s cultural life is undermined/enriched by migrants?” 
and “crime problems are worse/better with migrants?” 
 
All these variables have a certain percentage of NA responses. For the variable “worse place 
to live” the NA responses were 3.50%, for “worse crime” the NA responses were 4.80% and 
for “undermined cultural life” the NA responses were 3%.  
 
For both variables “worse place to live” and “worse crime” the biggest concentration of 
answers are on the grades from 0 to 7 whereas for the variable “undermined cultural life” the 
answers are more equally distributed on all grades. Also for these variables the grade with the 
major answers is the 5th.  
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TABLE 8a – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
Immigrants make country 
worse/better place to live 
Freq. Percent 
0 – Worse place to live 1,495 4.57 
1 975 2.98 
2 2,131 6.51 
3 3,129 9.56 
4 3,458 10.57 
5 10,224 31.24 
6 3,453 10.55 
7 3,581 10.94 
8 2,607 7.97 
9 828 2.53 
10 – Better place to live 845 2.58 
Total 32,726 100 
 
 
 
TABLE 8b – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
Immigrants make country’s  
Crime problems better/worse 
Freq. Percent 
0 – Worse crime problems 2,877 8.92 
1 1,995 6.18 
2 4,073 12.62 
3 5,603 17.37 
4 4,747 14.71 
5 9,381 29.07 
6 1,448 4.49 
7 1,139 3.53 
8 652 2.02 
9 211 0.65 
10 – Better crime problems 139 0.43 
Total 32,265 100 
 
TABLE 8c – Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants 
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Immigrants undermined/enriched 
Country’s cultural life 
Freq. Percent 
0 – Cultural life undermined 1,358 4.13 
1 886 2.69 
2 1,879 5.72 
3 2,728 8.30 
4 2,815 8.56 
5 6,719 20.44 
6 3,740 11.38 
7 4,935 15.01 
8 4,317 13.13 
9 1,665 5.06 
10 – Cultural life enriched 1,836 5.58 
Total 32,878 100 
 
For this study is fundamental to get a precise answer of only “bad” or “good”, “worse place” 
or “better place”, “undermined cultural life” or “enriched cultural life”, “positive effect” or 
“negative effect”. To achieve this goal all these variables were first recombine in only two 
specific answers. The sub-categories 1 and 2 for all the variables, were added to “0 - negative 
effect” while the others sub-categories “3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9” were added to “10- positive 
effect”.  
 
TABLE 9 – Summary of Economic and Non-economic attitudes toward immigrants 
 
 
 Economic attitudes Non-Economic attitudes 
 Immigration 
bad/good 
country’s 
economy 
Immigrants take out 
more than they put 
Immigrants 
take/ create 
new jobs 
Worse/Better place to 
live 
Worse/ Better crime 
problems 
Enriched/Undermin
ed cultural life 
       
 Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. 
Extreme 
Negative 
effect 
5,774 17.62 6,267 19.50 5,688 17.33 4,601 14.06 8,945 27.72 4,123 12.54 
Positive 
effect  
26,995 82.38 25,874 80.50 27,133 82.67 28,125 85.94 23,320 72.28 28,755 87.46 
Total  32,769 100 32,141 100 32,821 100 32,726 100 32,265 100 32,878 100 
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From a simple analysis of the answers of all these questions is easy to see that natives 
considered immigrants quite problematic from both, economic and non-economic points of 
view. The 17.6% of them thought that immigration was bad for the economy. The main 
reasons that led natives to have this thought stays in the fact that they are convinced that 
immigrants take their jobs away (19.5%) and pay on average fewer taxes and use more 
services than them (17.3%).  
 
From a non-economic point of view the situation is similar: 14.6% of respondents felt that 
immigrants make their country a worse place to live because they undermine country culture’s 
life (12.54%) and make their country crime problems worse (27.7%). 
 
The next step was to convert all the variables into dummies. If the values of the dummy 
variables were 1 it meant that immigration, from an economic and non-economic point of 
view was considered “negative” otherwise if the values were 0, immigration was considered 
“positive”.  
 
Group 4 embodies nine variables that express native opinions about the entrance of 
immigrants. The specific questions made to the individuals were: “would you allow unskilled 
laborers from poorer European and non-European countries?”, “would you allow professional 
from poorer European and non-European countries?”, “would you allow many/few migrants 
of different or same race/ethnic group as majority?”, “would you allow many/few migrants 
from poorer countries from outside and inside Europe?” and “would you allow many/few 
Muslims to your country?” 
 
All these questions in the original database have 7 possible answers: “1-Allow many to come 
and live here”, “2-allow some”, “3-allow a few”, “4-allow none”, “5-refuse to answer”, “6-
don’t know” and “NA”. For all the variables, the last 3 answers (refuse, don’t know and NA) 
were coded as missing values.  
For the variables “allow many/few migrants of different or same race/ethnic group from 
majority?” the NA responses on average were 2.45%, for the variable “allow many/few 
Muslims” the NA responses were 3.60%, and for the variables “allow many/few immigrants 
from poor non-European countries” the total NA responses for each one were 2.80%. The 
only variable with a higher number of NA responses (8.60%) was “allow many/few migrants 
from EU countries”. This is because this question was not field by the respondents from the 
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Czech Republic. The reason behind this choice was not specified by the authors of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The four variables “allow professionals or unskilled labors from European and non-European 
countries” had on average 0.70% of NA responses that were coded as missing values.  
The authors of this questionnaire decided to ask randomly to people only one of these four 
questions because they wanted to use these variables for another experiment. As a 
consequence of this decision all these variables have only 25% of information full field. The 
75% of information that is missing was coded as missing values.  
 
 
 
TABLE 10 – Summary of frequencies of attitudes toward immigrants 
 
 
 
 
In Table 10 are summarized all native’s answers to all the questions regarding the entrance of 
specific immigrants. Most natives would allow some or few immigrants of almost all types of 
immigrants, except for the unskilled workers coming from non-European countries. For this 
last specific case, the majority of natives would prefer to allow none or only a few of them 
into their country.  
 
The essential thing for this study is to have simple and specific answers at these questions like 
“Yes - allow many immigrants” or “No - allow none”. To get this result was important first to 
transform the four answers of each variable in only two answers. The answers "allow some" 
were added to "allow many" while the answers "allow few" were added to "allow none".  
The next step was to convert all the variables into dummies. If the variables had value 1 it 
implied that natives “would allow many immigrants” otherwise they “would not allow any 
immigrant”.  
 Allow 
immigrant 
from poor 
Eu 
Allow 
immigrants 
from poor 
non_Eu 
Allow 
immigrant 
of same 
race/ethnic 
group 
Allow 
immigrants 
of diff 
race/ethnic 
group 
 
 
Allow 
Muslims 
Allow 
professional 
workers 
from Eu 
Allow 
professional 
workers 
from 
non_Eu 
Allow 
unskilled 
workers 
form Eu 
Allow 
unskilled 
workers 
form 
non_Eu 
 
 
 
4,353 
 
12,767 
 
9,847 
 
4,007 
 
 
3,779 
 
11,535 
 
11,419 
 
6,214 
 
 
7,220 
 
15,793 
 
7,775 
 
2,289 
 
 
4,577 
 
13,805 
 
10,562 
 
4,127 
 
 
3,895 
 
10,875 
 
9,819 
 
8,082 
 
 
1,920 
 
3,698 
 
1,952 
 
644 
 
 
1,534 
 
3,610 
 
2,228 
 
885 
 
 
801 
 
2,743 
 
2,829 
 
2.020 
 
 
601 
 
2,051 
 
2,823 
 
2,597 
 
 
Total 
 
30,974 
 
32,947 
 
33,077 
 
33,071 
 
32,671 
 
8,214 
 
8,257 
 
8,393 
 
8,054 
57 
 
 
A poor analysis of the data shows that natives were emphasizing the anti-immigration 
sentiments. These sentiments were less strong for the European immigrants and stronger for 
the non-European immigrants. Graph 5 illustrates that more than half of individuals preferred 
to allow many immigrants coming from poor European countries rather than non-European 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5: distribution across the sample of anti-immigration sentiments 
 
The situation changes if we begin to specify the type of immigrant. Skilled or professional 
immigrants coming from European and non-European countries were more welcomed than 
the unskilled ones (68% for European immigrants and 62% for non-European immigrants). Is 
important to specify that also in this case the European unskilled and professional immigrants 
were more accepted than the non-European ones. 
 
Being of the same race or belong to the same ethnic group as the majority seemed not to be 
important for European natives. Graph 7 evidence that more than 60% of individuals of the 
sample would allow to their country individuals that have their same race or belong to their 
same ethnic group.  
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The percentage of admission for immigrants that have different race/ethnic group was also 
high even if was smaller than 14 percentage points than the previous one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6: anti-immigration sentiment with respect to unskilled or professional workers from European and non-European 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 7: anti-immigration sentiments with respect to individuals of same or different race/ethnic group as majority 
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Graph 8: distribution across the sample of anti-Muslims immigration 
 
Considering the episodes of terrorism in the world and especially in Europe in the last years it 
is important to examine also the anti-Muslims sentiments. 
By looking at the answers of the individuals is important to mention that in 2014 more than 
half of respondents were against Muslim immigration in their country. These feelings of 
rejection have grown over the past two years because of various terrorist attacks that have 
taken place in Europe.  
 
In the following Chapter it will be analyze the impact of demographic, economic, non-
economic, economic and non-economic attitudes variables, on the pro-immigration attitudes.  
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3.2 Results of empirical analysis:  
 
3.2.1 Economic and non-Economic Determinants of Individual preferences toward 
immigrants 
 
Who was against immigration in 2014? In which countries? Were the attitudes toward 
immigrants influenced only by economic considerations, or were driven also by non-
economic issues? Were people concerned about security and cultural issues?  
In these Sections, will try to answer to all these questions through an empirical analysis of the 
attitudes toward immigrants within and across countries. It will be investigated both economic 
and non-economic determinants.  
 
Economic and non-economic factors shape individual preferences over immigration policy. 
Among the demographic and socio-economic determinants, the three most important are age, 
the main working condition and the level of education of the respondents. The results of this 
analysis will put in evidence if there is a relation between these three aspects and the 
acceptance of immigrants.  
 
The variation in attitudes toward immigrants depend also on the differences in individual 
perceptions of the economy-wide benefits and cost of immigration. This is given by the fiscal 
impact of immigration on the welfare state and by the impact of immigration on the level of 
employment. In the receiving countries immigrants, will belong to the bottom of the income 
distribution or to the top depending on their education level and on their skills. If they are 
professional workers and have high education level, they probably will belong to the top of 
the income distribution and will contribute to taxes. They will have a positive impact on 
country’s economy. If instead, they are unskilled and have a low educational level they will 
be the beneficiaries of costly welfare programs and the impact on country’s economy will be 
negative. In both cases, they will search for a job and will have a negative effect on the level 
of native’s employment. This study will bring light on the relation between these two factors 
and the variation in attitudes of natives toward immigrants in Section 3.2.2 
 
Non-economic factors affect as well native’s opinion on immigration. They include: national 
identity, cultural considerations and security of the country. National identity if is strong will 
have a negative effect on the immigration opinions whereas if it is weak the effect will be 
positive. Xenophobic feelings also influence the votes in the political elections. Xenophobic 
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people will tend to vote for the right parties while the others for the left parties. Such non-
economic determinants and their impact on the preference of immigrants to allow will be 
considered and analyzed in this Section.  
 
At this point is important to ask ourselves if is right to use the word “xenophobia” instead of 
“racism”.  The US prefer to use the term “racism” because of their own particular history. 
Europe have less experience with the charge black-white dynamics and anti-racism activism 
that America knows well. Moreover the Europeans, especially the Germans are allergic to 
term “racism” because of the Holocaust, so they are more open to use the term “xenophobia”. 
 
To test for the impact of economic and non-economic variables on pro-immigration attitudes 
was used the method of Multivariate Linear Regression Model.  
 
The dependent variables y used were: “allow many immigrants from poor European 
countries”, “allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries”, “allow many 
immigrants of same race or ethnic group as the majority”, “allow many immigrants of 
different race or ethnic group as the majority”, “allow many Muslims”, “allow many 
professional workers from European countries”, “allow many professional workers from non-
European countries”, “allow many unskilled workers from European countries” and “Allow 
many unskilled workers from non-European countries”.  
 
The independent variables used for this part of analysis were: age,𝑎𝑔𝑒2, gender, citizenship, 
country, education, employment, political affiliation with extreme right, nationalism feelings 
and religion.  
 
The first step of the analysis was to study only the demographic impact on the pro-
immigration attitudes. The results are illustrated in Table 11 in the Appendix Section.  
 
The second step was to analyze the impact of both demographic and socio-economic 
determinants on the acceptance of immigrants. In Table 12 are highlighted the results of this 
second analysis. 
 
In the third step the analysis has focused on demographic economic and non-economic 
determinants. It was important to investigate also the correlation patterns between attitudes 
toward immigrants and individual answers to question about both economic and non-
economic issues.  
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The models that were considerate to put in evidence these aspects were:  
 
 
y = α +  β1age +  β2age
2 + β3male + β4citizen + β5 i. country + β6 i. education
+ β7i. employment + β8political affiliation with extreme right
+ β9nationalist + β10 i. religion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13a - Multivariate Linear regression models 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 13a reports only the results for the demographic and economic determinants.  
The estimates for age and 𝑎𝑔𝑒2 are both statistically significant in the models: “allow many 
immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority” and “allow professional workers from 
European and non- European countries”. In these last models age has a negative impact on 
pro-immigration attitude whereas 𝑎𝑔𝑒2 has a positive impact. The two signs indicate that 
young natives in 2014, preferred restrictive immigration policies while old natives preferred 
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_prof 
Eu 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
Age -0.00326*** -0.000149 -0.00235*** -0.00205** -0.00379*** -0.00367** -0.00630*** 0.00305* 0.000567 
 
 
(0.000870) (0.000852) (0.000784) (0.000838) (0.000826) (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00171) (0.00167) 
age2 1.11e-05 -2.25e-05*** 1.31e-05* -1.17e-07 8.11e-06 3.16e-05** 4.12e-05** -2.09e-05 -2.10e-05 
 
 
(8.52e-06) (8.36e-06) (7.69e-06) (8.22e-06) (8.10e-06) (1.56e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.65e-05) 
Male -0.00161 -0.00873 0.00358 0.000383 0.0118** 0.0297*** 0.00765 0.0122 0.0101 
 
 
(0.00567) (0.00548) (0.00505) (0.00540) (0.00530) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0107) 
Citizens  -0.0402 -0.0110 -0.0615* -0.0265 -0.00155 -0.0739 -0.112 0.00764 -0.0127 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0355) (0.0380) (0.0372) (0.0796) (0.0777) (0.0710) (0.0733) 
Primary 
education 
-0.0881*** -0.0905*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.111*** -0.0960*** -0.0674*** 
 
 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00979) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0208) 
Tertiary educ 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.143*** 0.176*** 0.202*** 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.183*** 0.162*** 
 
 
(0.00681) (0.00665) (0.00613) (0.00656) (0.00644) (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0130) 
Other -0.0338 -0.0861 -0.0319 -0.0457 0.00205 0.0704 0.103 -0.100 -0.0211 
 
MAIN WORKING 
CONDITION  
(0.0551) (0.0553) (0.0507) (0.0542) (0.0537) (0.0996) (0.107) (0.124) (0.103) 
Self-employed 0.0104 0.0164* 0.0161* 0.0107 0.0101 0.0127 0.0257 0.0283 0.00715 
 
 
(0.00918) (0.00892) (0.00823) (0.00881) (0.00864) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0167) 
Working for own 
family business  
-0.0315 -0.0151 0.00573 -0.0573*** -0.0112 -0.0207 0.0476 0.0445 -0.0376 
 
 
(0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0430) (0.0421) 
Unemployed 0.0299** 0.0311** 0.0242** 0.0332*** 0.0245** 0.0286 0.00110 0.0507** 0.000707 
 
 
(0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0245) (0.0243) 
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the expansionary immigration policies.  
In the models “allow many immigrants from poor European countries”, “allow many 
Muslims” and “allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as the majority” the 
estimates for age are all negative while the estimates for 𝑎𝑔𝑒2 are non-significant. The 
negative correlation of age with the pro-immigration attitudes indicate that young natives 
would not accept the entry of these three categories of immigrants. Old natives instead, were 
against the immigration policies that would allow the entrance of many immigrants from poor 
non-European countries. The immigration of unskilled workers from European countries was 
accepted only by the young people whereas the immigration of unskilled workers from non-
European countries had no impact on both young and old natives.  
 
The gender effect was strong in the model “allow many professional workers from European 
countries” and less strong in the model “allow many Muslims”. Both estimates are positive and 
indicate that men on average would have accepted more Muslims (0.0118, significant at the 5% 
level) and professional workers from Europe (0.0297, significant at 1% level) than women.  
 
Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of “immigrants of 
same race/ethnic group as the majority” (-0.0615, significant at 10% level). In all the other 
modes, the variable citizenship had no significant impact on the pro-immigration attitude.  
 
The most robust findings in the previous models, is a significant and positive impact of 
education on the acceptance of immigrants. The variable “Education” is treated as a dummy 
variable in all models. It was studied in the previous Chapter that more than 60% of the 
responded completed at least the secondary education. For this reason it was decided to 
consider the “secondary level of education” as the reference group. The study reveals the fact 
that Education had a significant impact on the feelings of xenophobia. Natives with only the 
primary education were more intolerant and xenophobic to immigrants than the ones with the 
secondary education. All the estimates for primary education are statistically significant at 1% 
level, and are negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes.  
Natives with a higher education than the secondary seemed to be more open to new 
immigration waves. The estimates in the tertiary education case are statistically significant at 
1% level and positively correlated with the pro-immigration attitude.  
 
The main working condition indicates the main work carried out by natives during their life. 
In the previous Chapter it was said that 80% of the respondents were employee during the 
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collection period of the data. For this reason the category employee was chosen as the 
reference category.  
The results from the analysis of the data evidence that self-employed were more tolerant than 
employees to the entrance of non-European immigrants and to immigrants with same 
race/ethnic group. Similar situation was for the unemployed case. These last ones would have 
allow in their country also immigrants from poor-European countries, Muslims, immigrants 
with difference race/ethnic group, professional workers and unskilled coming only from 
European countries. The percentage of natives that work for their own family businesses 
seemed to be more intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different 
race/ethnic group. 
 
TABLE 13b - Multivariate Linear regression models 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_prof 
Eu 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
political 
affiliation with 
extreme right  
-0.108*** -0.112*** -0.0489*** -0.105*** -0.113*** -0.0700*** -0.0589*** -0.0541*** -0.0926*** 
 
 
(0.00829) (0.00800) (0.00736) (0.00788) (0.00774) (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0160) 
Nationalist  -0.00215 -0.0251** 0.0326*** -0.00635 0.000289 0.0151 0.0199 -0.0387* -0.0183 
 
RELIGION:  
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.00949) (0.0102) (0.00997) (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0196) 
Protestant  0.0127 0.0110 0.0127 0.0150 0.0201** 0.0224 0.00658 -0.0345* 0.0140 
 
 
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.00953) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0202) 
Eastern Orthodox -0.0948*** -0.0993*** 0.0130 -0.0415 -0.0439 0.114* -0.0153 -0.175*** 0.0183 
 
 
(0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0279) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0633) (0.0553) (0.0614) (0.0566) 
Other Christian 
denomination 
0.132*** 0.127*** 0.0580** 0.115*** 0.104*** -0.0438 -0.0599 0.0314 0.126** 
 
 
(0.0300) (0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0278) (0.0544) (0.0612) (0.0538) (0.0560) 
Jewish 0.0485 0.0194 -0.0142 0.0547 0.163* 0.199 0.0255 0.0174 0.258 
 
 
(0.0988) (0.0964) (0.0890) (0.0952) (0.0951) (0.215) (0.170) (0.189) (0.182) 
Islamic 0.0550 0.0994*** 0.0632* 0.152*** 0.291*** 0.0122 0.166** 0.115* 0.152** 
 
 
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0325) (0.0348) (0.0342) (0.0659) (0.0661) (0.0682) (0.0724) 
Eastern religions  0.138** 0.133** 0.0845 0.192*** 0.182*** 0.135 0.236* 0.172* 0.226** 
 
 
(0.0574) (0.0560) (0.0517) (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.125) (0.121) (0.102) (0.0938) 
Other non-
Christian 
religions  
0.144** 0.177*** 0.0984* 0.101* 0.129** 0.00692 0.0523 -0.0381 0.178* 
 
 
(0.0592) (0.0568) (0.0528) (0.0565) (0.0548) (0.130) (0.0991) (0.120) (0.100) 
Atheist  0.0250*** 0.0299*** -0.000212 0.0246*** 0.0363*** 0.00197 0.00345 -0.0113 0.0465*** 
 
 
 
(0.00782) (0.00758) (0.00698) (0.00747) (0.00733) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0146) 
Constant 0.621*** 0.507*** 0.764*** 0.595*** 0.560*** 0.793*** 0.829*** 0.260*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0420) (0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0915) (0.0912) (0.0859) (0.0868) 
          
Observations 
 
27,456 29,208 29,308 29,304 28,993 7,307 7,317 7,372 7,165 
R-squared 0.131 0.149 0.120 0.155 0.207 0.127 0.129 0.141 0.123 
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Affiliation with more conservative political parties is for all the models statistically significant 
at the 1% level and negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences. Natives who had 
affiliation with the extreme right parties would have allowed less immigrants than those that 
had affiliation with the left parties. In the last two years right parties started to become more 
powerful and to have a higher influence in the political decision in many European and non-
European countries.  
 
The variable nationalist quantifies the extent of individual attachment to the nation. The 
results from the regressions are consistent with the intuition that individuals who feel close to 
their country’s identity are more likely to be anti-immigration. Only in the models “allow 
many immigrants from poor non-European countries”, “allow immigrants with same 
race/ethnic group as majority” and “allow many unskilled workers from European countries” 
the estimates are statistically significant. In all the other models feeling very close to your 
country has no impact on the entrance of new immigrants.  
The estimates in the two models “allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries” 
and “allow many unskilled workers from European countries” are significant at 5% and 10% 
level and both have a negative impact on the pro-immigration attitude. The only estimate that 
is significant at the 1% level and is positive is the model “allow many immigrants of same 
race/ethnic group as majority”. This may suggest that whether an individual belonged to the 
dominant ethnic group in the society did not have a negative influence on the pro-immigration 
attitudes. 
 
The religion of natives has an important impact on the feelings of xenophobia. The variable 
religion was treated as a dummy variable and the Catholics group was taken as the reference 
group.  
In the first model “allow many immigrants from poor European countries” only the estimates 
of Eastern orthodox, other Christina denominations, Eastern religions, other non-Christian 
religions and atheist are significant. Eastern orthodox estimate is the only one that is 
negatively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes. It is significant al 1% level and reveals 
the fact that Orthodox were more anti-immigrants than Catholics. The estimates of other 
Christina denominations, and Atheists are significant at 1% level while the estimates of 
Eastern religions and other non-Christian religions are significant at 5% level. All four 
estimates are posited and indicate that these four religions on average were less xenophobic 
than the Catholicism.  
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In the second model “allow many immigrants from poor non-European countries” the 
situation is almost identical to the previous one. The only difference is the estimate of Islamic 
religion that becomes significant at 1% level and positively correlated with pro-immigration 
attitudes.  
 
In the third model “allow immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority” only the 
estimates of Other Christians denomination, other non-Christian religions and Islamic are 
significant. The first one is significant at the 1% level while the reaming two are significant at 
the 10% level. All three estimates are positive and show that these three religions were more 
open to immigration then the Catholic. 
 
The forth model “allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority” and the 
fifth model “allow many Muslims” are very similar to each other. In both models the 
estimates for Other Christian denomination, Islamic, Eastern religions and atheists are 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The differences between these two models 
are: the different level of significance of other non-Christian religions, and the presence of a 
positive effect of Protestants and Jewish only in the “allow many Muslims” model.  
To recap: Protestants and Jewish were more open only to Muslims migration than Catholics, 
Other Christian denominations, Other non-Christian religions, Islamic, Eastern religions and 
atheists were open to both type of immigrants.  
 
In the sixth model “allow many professional workers from European countries” only the 
estimate of Eastern orthodox is positive and significant at 10% level. In this case Eastern 
orthodox were more tolerant to professional workers immigration than Catholics. 
  
In the seventh model “allow many professional workers from non-European countries” the 
only significant estimates were: Islamic and Eastern religions. The Islamic religion and the 
Eastern religions seemed to be to be much more tolerant of the entry of new professional 
workers than the Catholics. 
 
The unskilled workers from European countries were welcome by the Islamic religions and 
Eastern religions but were unwelcomed by the Protestants and Eastern Orthodoxies whereas 
the unskilled workers from non-European countries were welcomed by almost all the regions 
excluded Protestant, Orthodox and Jewish.  
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In conclusion, if are considered both, economic and non-economic aspects the xenophobia 
feelings was present in the young natives but not in the old natives. Young natives were 
intolerant to the entry of immigrants from poor European countries but very tolerant to the 
entry of European unskilled workers.  
The gender effect was strong and significant in the two models “allow many Muslims” and 
“allow many European professional workers”. In this case, xenophobia feelings were less 
present in men than in women.  
Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of “immigrants of 
same race/ethnic group as the majority” 
The two variables that were very significant and produced a strong impact were education and 
the affiliation with a more conservative political party. The first one was significant for both 
primary and tertiary level of education in all models. The primary education is negative and 
specifies that people with a lower level of education than the secondary were more 
xenophobic. Natives instead, with a level of education higher than the secondary were more 
open to new waves of immigrants. The second variable is significant and negative and 
indicates that being in contact with a conservative political party has made people more 
xenophobic.  
The impact of religion is also important and significant. This study in putting in evidence the 
fact that Protestants and Eastern Orthodoxies with respect to Catholics were more close to 
new waves of immigration whereas all the other religions were more open.   
 
 
 
 
.  
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3.2.2 Economic and Non-Economic determinants and Economic and non-Economic 
attitudes of Individual preferences toward immigrants 
 
This last section is dedicated to the analysis of economic and non-economic determinants with 
economic and non-economic attitudes toward immigrants included. At this point was 
fundamental to test also for the economic and non-economic issues like security worries, 
cultural and national-identity because they had a large effect on immigration opinions.  
 
The models that will be used in this Section, to make these analyses were:  
 
 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒
2 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽5 𝑖. 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽6 𝑖. 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑖. 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑖. 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽11 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽12 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽13 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦
+ 𝛽14 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽15 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑑
+ 𝛽16 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒
+ 𝛽17 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽18 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒
+ 𝛽19  𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑  
 
 
 
 
 
In Table 15 are summarized the results of the Multivariate linear regression models on 
immigration preferences, whose focus is on the social-economic, non-economic background 
and economic and non-economic attitudes toward immigrants.  
 
The results for age and age2 are different to the one in the previous Section. Old people were 
more favored than the young people to immigration restrictions especially in the case of 
immigrants coming from poor non-European countries and unskilled workers. Young people 
instead, were more open to the immigration of unskilled workers and people coming from 
non-European countries, but less open to the immigration of Muslims and professional 
workers coming from non-European countries. Both young and old natives seemed to be 
indifferent in the case of immigration by people from poor European countries, people that 
have different race/ethnic group as majority and professional workers from European 
countries.  
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Gender again, is a key non-economic factor that affects immigration opinion. The estimates in 
the models “allow many Muslims” and “allow many professional workers from European 
countries” are positive and significant at 1% level while in the model “allow many unskilled 
workers from European countries” is significant only at 5% level. The results evidence that 
men compared to women were less xenophobic regarding the immigration of Muslims 
(0.0203) and workers, both professional (0.0303) and unskilled (0.0251), coming from 
European countries.  
 
TABLE 15a – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables)  
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_profEu 
 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
Age of respondent -0.00139 0.00192** -0.00141* -2.88e-05 -0.00171** -0.00245 -0.00366** 0.00507*** 0.00307* 
 
 
(0.000871) (0.000860) (0.000783) (0.000834) (0.000832) (0.00160) (0.00168) (0.00176) (0.00172) 
age2 8.37e-07 -3.50e-05*** 1.09e-05 -1.13e-05 -3.36e-06 2.43e-05 2.27e-05 -3.26e-05* -3.93e-05** 
 
 
(8.60e-06) (8.51e-06) (7.75e-06) (8.25e-06) (8.24e-06) (1.58e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.71e-05) 
Male 0.000945 -0.00316 0.00690 0.00317 0.0203*** 0.0303*** 0.0125 0.0251** 0.0111 
 
 
(0.00559) (0.00546) (0.00497) (0.00530) (0.00528) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
Citizens -0.0265 0.00146 -0.0739** -0.0356 0.0139 -0.0647 -0.137* -0.0702 0.0530 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0367) (0.0780) (0.0786) (0.0719) (0.0725) 
Primary education -0.0371*** -0.0504*** -0.0985*** -0.0826*** -0.0922*** -0.0934*** -0.0674*** -0.0672*** -0.0433** 
 
 
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00983) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0199) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0217) 
Tertiary educ 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.0816*** 0.107*** 0.143*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.140*** 0.116*** 
 
 
(0.00674) (0.00665) (0.00605) (0.00644) (0.00643) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0134) 
Other -0.0873 -0.122** -0.0898* -0.113** -0.0886* -0.00740 0.0598 -0.185 0.0239 
 
MAIN WORKING 
CONDITION:  
(0.0548) (0.0556) (0.0503) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0994) (0.111) (0.124) (0.109) 
Self-employed 0.00436 0.0124 0.0124 0.00510 0.00885 0.0154 0.0231 0.0193 -0.000520 
 
 
(0.00905) (0.00891) (0.00811) (0.00864) (0.00861) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0171) 
Working for own family 
business  
-0.0314 -0.0151 0.00989 -0.0554*** 0.000652 -0.00188 0.0398 0.111** -0.0202 
 
 
(0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0457) (0.0435) 
Unemployed 0.0201 0.0248** 0.0209* 0.0246** 0.0178 0.00863 0.0154 0.0370 0.00317 
 
 
(0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0233) (0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0253) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Being citizen of the country, also in these cases, had a negative impact on the acceptance of 
“immigrants of same race/ethnic group as the majority” (-0.0739, significant at 1% level) and 
“professional workers from non-European countries” (-0.137, significant at 10% level). In all 
the other modes, the variable citizenship had no significant impact on the pro-immigration 
attitude.  
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The impact of education on pro-immigration attitudes is similar the one evidenced in the 
previous models in the previous Section. Also in these models the variable “Education” was 
treated as a dummy variable with the “secondary level of education” as the reference group. 
The study reveals the fact natives with only the primary education were more intolerant to 
immigrants and xenophobic than the ones with the secondary education. All the estimates for 
primary education are statistically significant at 1% level, and are negatively correlated with 
the pro-immigration attitudes. Natives with a higher education than the secondary were more 
open to new immigration waves. The estimates in the tertiary education case are statistically 
significant at 1% level and positively correlated with the pro-immigration attitude.  
Finally, natives that have other educations than the primary, secondary or tertiary were more 
intolerant than those that have completed the secondary, to immigrants from poor non-
European countries (-0.122, significant at 5% level), immigrants with same (-0.0898, 
significant at 10% level) or different (-0.113, significant at 5%level) race/ethnic group as 
majority and to Muslims (-0.0886, significant at 10% level). 
 
The main working condition also in these cases indicates the main work carried out by natives 
during their life. The employee is still the reference category.  
The results from the analysis of the data evidence that the unemployed natives were more 
tolerant than the employee, to the entrance of immigrants from poor non-European countries 
(0.0248, significant at 5% level) and to immigrants with same (0.0209, significant at 10% 
level) and different (0.0246, significant at 5% level) race/ethnic group as the majority.  
The percentage of natives that work for their own family businesses seemed to be more 
intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different race/ethnic group (-
0.0554, significant at 1% level). 
 
Affiliation with more conservative political parties had a big effect on immigration 
preferences. The estimates for the models “allow many immigrants from poor European and 
non-European countries”, “allow many Muslims”, “allow many immigrants with different 
race/ethnic group as the majority” and “allow many unskilled from non-European countries” 
are significant at the 1% level and are negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences. 
This means that any connections with the extreme right parties made native be more 
xenophobic especially with respect to immigrants coming from poor European (-0.0500) and 
non-European (-0.0580) countries, Muslims (-0.0602), people with different race/ethnic group 
(-0.0475) and unskilled workers (-0.0449) from non-European countries.  
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For all the other models being in contact with the extreme right parties had no impact on pro-
immigration attitudes 
 
The attachment of each native to their nation is quantify through the variable nationalist. Only 
in the models “allow many immigrants from poor European and non-European countries” and 
“allow many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority” the estimates of 
nationalist is significant at 1% level. In the models “allow many Muslims “and “allow many 
unskilled from European countries” the estimates are significant at 5% level while in the 
model “allow many unskilled from non-European countries” the estimate is significant at 10% 
level. In a few words this is indicating that natives that felt more close to their country 
(nationalist) tend to allow less immigrants from poor European (-0.0304) and non-European (-
0.0482) countries, Muslims (-0.0224), immigrants with different race/ethnic group (-0.0348) 
and unskilled worker coming from European (-0.0537) and non-European (-0.0363) countries.  
For all the other models being nationalist had no impact on pro-immigration attitudes 
 
TABLE 15b – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables)  
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_profEu 
 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
political affiliation with 
extreme right  
-0.0500*** -0.0580*** -0.00538 -0.0475*** -0.0602*** -0.0199 -0.0102 -0.00346 -0.0449*** 
 
 
(0.00827) (0.00805) (0.00733) (0.00780) (0.00778) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0166) 
Nationalist  -0.0304*** -0.0482*** 0.00365 -0.0348*** -0.0224** -0.0140 -0.00973 -0.0534** -0.0363* 
 
RELIGION:  
(0.0103) (0.0102) (0.00928) (0.00988) (0.00986) (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0198) 
Protestant 0.000672 -0.000233 0.00249 0.00662 0.00762 0.0182 0.00119 -0.0377* 0.00571 
 
 
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00929) (0.00988) (0.00986) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0205) 
Eastern Orthodox -0.119*** -0.130*** -0.0440 -0.0811*** -0.0647** 0.0892 -0.00160 -0.274*** -0.0276 
 
 
(0.0319) (0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0699) (0.0591) (0.0652) (0.0603) 
Other Christian denomination 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.0559** 0.105*** 0.0928*** -0.0483 -0.0531 0.0179 0.0998* 
 
 
(0.0301) (0.0294) (0.0269) (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0553) (0.0620) (0.0564) (0.0592) 
Jewish 0.0385 0.00663 0.0309 0.0741 0.179* 0.172 0.141 -0.0454 0.285 
 
 
(0.0990) (0.0997) (0.0909) (0.0968) (0.0962) (0.235) (0.174) (0.198) (0.193) 
Islamic -0.0177 0.0260 0.00688 0.0811** 0.222*** -0.0129 0.105 0.0471 0.133* 
 
 
(0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0312) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0639) (0.0647) (0.0669) (0.0738) 
Eastern religions 0.0922* 0.0917* 0.0506 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.0980 0.210* 0.129 0.210** 
 
 
(0.0539) (0.0535) (0.0488) (0.0523) (0.0512) (0.118) (0.115) (0.100) (0.0927) 
Other non-Christian religions  0.149*** 0.185*** 0.106** 0.111** 0.125** 0.0273 0.00891 -0.0240 0.125 
 
 
(0.0570) (0.0556) (0.0510) (0.0543) (0.0536) (0.129) (0.0986) (0.119) (0.0996) 
Atheist  0.0216*** 0.0213*** -0.00445 0.0184** 0.0275*** 0.00478 0.00644 -0.0174 0.0432*** 
 (0.00773) (0.00758) (0.00690) (0.00734) (0.00732) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0150) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Religion has a significant impact on the feelings of xenophobia. Protestants were more 
xenophobic than Catholics, with respect to unskilled workers coming from European 
countries (-0.0377, significant at 10% level) and were indifferent for all the other categories 
of immigrants. 
Orthodoxies were more intolerant than Catholics to the immigration of European (-0.119) and 
non-European (-0.130) individuals, Muslims (-0.0647), European unskilled workers (-0.274) 
and individuals with different race/ethnic group (-0.0811) 
Jewish were less xenophobic than Catholics, only with respect to Muslims (0.179, significant 
at 10% level) and indifferent with respect to all the other categories.  
The other Christian denominations were more tolerant than the Catholic religion to the 
entrance of European (0.121, significant at 1% level) and non-European (0.113, significant at 
1%level) immigrants, Muslims (0.0928, significant at 1% level), immigrants with same 
(0.0559, significant at 5% level) and different (0.105, significant at 1% level) race/ethnic 
group as majority and non-European unskilled workers (0.0998, significant at 10% level).   
Islamic religion compared to the Catholic would accept many immigrants of different 
race/ethnic group (0.0811, significant at 5% level), many Muslims (0.222, significant at 1% 
level) and many non-European unskilled workers (0.133, significant at 10%level).  
Natives that had other Eastern religions, like Buddhism, tended to be less discriminatory than 
Catholics especially for the immigrants coming from poor European (0.0922, significant at 
10%level) and non-European (0.0917, significant at 10%level) countries, immigrants with 
different race/ethnic group (0.160, significant at 1% level), Muslims (0.147, significant at 1% 
level), non-European unskilled workers (0.210, significant at 5% level) and professional 
workers from non-European countries (0.210, significant at 10% level).  
Also atheist and other non-Christian religions compared to Christians were more open to new 
immigration waves. They both would accepted more immigrants from poor European and 
non-European countries, Muslims and immigrants with different race/ethnic group as the 
majority. The differences between the two categories are two. The first one is that individuals 
with other non-Christian religions were positive also to the immigration of the individuals 
with same race/ethnic group while atheist seemed to be indifferent. The second difference is 
that atheist were positive with respect to the entrance of non-European unskilled workers 
while individuals that believe in other non-Christian religions were indifferent.  
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TABLE 15c – Multivariate Linear regression models (with all variables) 
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_profEu 
 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
         
Bad for the economy -0.159*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.103*** -0.0923*** -0.112*** -0.0452*** -0.0789*** 
 
 
(0.00978) (0.00943) (0.00860) (0.00915) (0.00913) (0.0176) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0189) 
Generally take out more -0.0764*** -0.0830*** -0.0635*** -0.0808*** -0.0907*** -0.0658*** -0.105*** -0.0904*** -0.0491*** 
 
 
 
(0.00887) (0.00858) (0.00781) (0.00831) (0.00829) (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0169) 
Take jobs away -0.0528*** -0.0282*** -0.0818*** -0.0637*** -0.0286*** -0.129*** -0.0662*** -0.0843*** -0.0117 
 
 
(0.00958) (0.00914) (0.00833) (0.00887) (0.00885) (0.0170) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0180) 
Extremely important educ -0.0424*** -0.0350*** -0.0125** -0.0303*** -0.0276*** 0.0114 -0.00349 -0.0570*** -0.0403*** 
 
 
(0.00666) (0.00649) (0.00591) (0.00630) (0.00628) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0129) 
Extremely important work 
skills  
-0.0885*** -0.109*** -0.0340*** -0.0750*** -0.0960*** -0.0171 -0.0253** -0.123*** -0.116*** 
 
NON-ECONOIMC 
ATTITUDES:  
 
(0.00660) (0.00643) (0.00585) (0.00623) (0.00621) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0127) 
Extremely important 
Christian background 
-0.00848 -0.0366*** -0.0357*** -0.0646*** -0.0732*** -0.0518*** -0.0411** 0.00613 -0.00878 
 
 
(0.0103) (0.00980) (0.00893) (0.00950) (0.00946) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0196) 
Extremely important be white -0.0691*** -0.0320*** -0.0807*** -0.0590*** -0.0348*** -0.0729*** -0.109*** 0.0148 0.00903 
 
 
(0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0237) 
Crime problems made worse -0.0818*** -0.0896*** -0.0391*** -0.0911*** -0.122*** -0.0505*** -0.0654*** -0.0729*** -0.104*** 
 
 
(0.00739) (0.00721) (0.00657) (0.00699) (0.00698) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Worse place to live -0.109*** -0.0822*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.0833*** -0.107*** -0.0870*** -0.0112 -0.0702*** 
 
 
(0.0110) (0.0106) (0.00965) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0210) 
Cultural life undermined -0.0918*** -0.0735*** -0.0812*** -0.0900*** -0.0633*** -0.0216 -0.0585*** -0.0791*** -0.0432** 
 
 
(0.0110) (0.0106) (0.00963) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0211) 
Constant 0.799*** 0.672*** 0.921*** 0.778*** 0.719*** 0.916*** 0.962*** 0.493*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0411) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0905) (0.0928) (0.0875) (0.0869) 
          
Observations 
 
24,536 26,061 26,082 26,085 25,924 6,546 6,505 6,558 6,392 
R-squared 0.243 0.249 0.232 0.275 0.300 0.214 0.215 0.216 0.193 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The variation in attitudes toward immigrants depended also on the impact of their entrance on 
the private and economic life of each native. This impact can be summarized in the variables: 
Bad for the economy, generally take out more and Take jobs away. From the descriptive 
analysis of each variable was evidence the fact that natives considered immigrants quite 
problematic from both, economic and non-economic points of view. The 17.6% of them think 
that immigration was bad for the economy. The main reasons that led natives to have this 
thought stayed in the fact that they believed that immigrants took their jobs away (19.5%) and 
paid on average fewer taxes and use more services than them (17.3%). From a non-economic 
point of view the situation was similar: 14.6% of respondents felt that immigrants make their 
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country a worse place to live because they undermined country cultural life (12.54%) and 
made their country crime problems worse (27.7%). 
 
In Table 15c is summarized the impact of these variables on the pro-immigration attitudes.  
 
In all the nine models the estimates of the variable “bad for the economy” is significant at 1% 
level and is negatively correlated with the pro-immigration opinions. A responded who agreed 
strongly with the statement that immigration was bad for the country’s economy was more 
likely to not support a raise in immigration.  
 
 The estimates of the variable “take jobs away” in all the models are negative and very strong 
correlated (at 1% level) with the pro-immigration opinions, except for the estimate in the 
model “allow many unskilled workers from outside Europe” that had no impact on the 
feelings of xenophobia. This suggest that natives that agreed with the statement that 
immigrants took their jobs away were not supported another increase in the level of 
immigration.  
 
The pro-immigration attitude toward immigrants is given also by the perception of the 
economy-wide benefits and cost of immigration through the impact on the welfare state. All 
the estimate in the models are negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes and 
significant at the 1% level, The results in Table 15c evidence that respondents that believed 
that immigrants used more health and welfare services than the ones they have paid for with 
taxes, were not favorable to a raise in immigration. 
 
Cultural issues are related to the intrinsic side effect of immigration: the meeting of people. 
The integration of immigrants in the destination society may feed cultural worries, driven by 
the belief that the values and traditions that characterize the receiving country’s society are 
threatened by the arrival of the foreigners. This worries are captured by the high values of the 
variable “Cultural life undermined”. In Table 15c, is evidence the fact that if an individual 
either agreed or strongly agreed with the claim that immigrants made the country less open to 
new ideas and cultures would be more likely to not support a raise in immigration. Similarly, 
a respondent who either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that immigrants made 
the country a worse place to live would be more likely to not support a raise in immigration.  
 
The estimates of the variable “crime problems made worse” are significant at 1% level and 
negative in all models. This result evidence the fact that if a respondent agreed with the claim 
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that immigrants raise crime rates, the probability that he agreed with another increase in 
immigration was low 
 
The next four variables that were considered in this study were “Extremely important good 
educational qualifications”, “Extremely important work skills”, “Extremely important 
Christian backgrounds “and “Extremely important be white”. These variables stress the 
importance that the natives gave to the good educational qualification, to work skills, to 
religion and to the skin color in deciding whether to accept immigrants. The fact of 
considering “having good educational qualification”, “having the needed work skills”, 
“having Christian background” and “having white skin” extremely important, increased the 
anti-immigration feelings. Almost all the estimates are negatively correlated with pro-
immigration attitudes and are significant at 1% level. The exceptions are the estimate of 
“extremely important good educational qualifications” in the model “allow many professional 
workers from European and non-European countries” that are non-significant, the estimates of 
“Extremely important be white” in the models “allow many unskilled from European and 
non-European countries” that are both non-significant, the estimates of “extremely important 
Christian background” in the models “allow many unskilled workers form European and non-
European countries” that are non-significant and the estimates of “extremely important work 
skills” in the model “allow professional workers from Europe” that is non significant.  
 
The measure of goodness of fit is given by the 𝑅2 measures. The percentage of the total 
variance explained by the preferred specifications (including the dummy variables) is 
approximately 24% for the model “allow many immigrants from poor European countries”, 
25% for “allow many from poor non-European countries”, 23% for “allow immigrants of 
same race/ethnic group as majority” while 27% “of different race/ethnic group”, and 30% for 
the model “allow many Muslims”.  
The four last models have only around 6000 observations, and their 𝑅2 is 21% for the model 
“allow many professional workers form Europe”, and is 21% for the model of “unskilled 
workers from Europe”. Whereas for the workers coming from outside Europe the 𝑅2 is 21% 
for “allow many professional workers” and 19% for “allow many unskilled workers”.  
 
In conclusion young people were more open to unskilled workers from European and non-
European countries and to immigrants from poor non-European countries but less open to the 
immigration of Muslims and non-European professional workers. Old natives instead were 
less open to the immigration of people from poor non-European countries and unskilled 
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workers. Both young and old natives seemed to be indifferent in the case of immigration by 
people from poor European countries, people that had different race/ethnic group as majority 
and professional workers from European countries.  
 
Gender evidence that men compared to women were less xenophobic regarding the 
immigration of Muslims and workers, both professional and unskilled coming from European 
countries. 
 
Being citizen of the country had a negative impact only on the acceptance of “immigrants of 
same race/ethnic group as the majority” and “professional workers from non-European 
countries”. 
 
The study reveals the fact natives with only the primary education were more intolerant to 
immigrants and xenophobic than the ones with the secondary education. Natives with a higher 
education than the secondary seemed to be more open to new immigration waves. Natives that 
have other educations than the primary, secondary or tertiary were more intolerant than those 
that have completed the secondary, to immigrants from poor non-European countries, 
immigrants with same or different race/ethnic group as majority and to Muslims. 
 
From the study of main working condition variable is important to say that unemployed 
natives were more tolerant than the employee, to the entrance of immigrants from poor non-
European countries and to immigrants with same and different race/ethnic group as the 
majority. The natives that worked for their own family businesses seemed to be more 
intolerant to the immigration of individuals that belong to different race/ethnic group. 
 
The connections with the extreme right parties made native be more xenophobic especially 
with respect to immigrants coming from poor European and non-European countries, 
Muslims, people with different race/ethnic group and unskilled workers from non-European 
countries.  
 
The nationalism feeling tended to increase the level of intolerance with respect to immigrants 
from poor European and non-European countries, Muslims, immigrants with different 
race/ethnic group and unskilled worker coming from European and non-European countries.  
 
The impact of religion show that only Protestants and Orthodoxies were more xenophobic 
than Catholics. All the other religions compared to the Catholic were more open to new 
immigration waves.  
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The results in Table 15c suggest that if an individual agreed with the claims that immigrants 
had a negative impact on the country’s economy, took jobs away, paid less taxes than the 
benefits that used, made the country less open to new ideas and cultures and made the country 
a worse place to live, was more likely to not support a raise in immigration.  
 
The last variables considered were: “Extremely important good educational qualifications”, 
“Extremely important work skills”, “Extremely important Christian backgrounds” and 
“Extremely important be white”. The fact of considering “having good educational 
qualification”, “having the needed working skills”, “having Christian background” and 
“having white skin” extremely important, increased the anti-immigration feelings.  
 
In the next section, it will be answered to the question: Does the correlation between 
individual socio-economic characteristics and immigration preferences vary across countries?  
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3.2.3 Does the correlation between individual socio-economic characteristics and 
immigration preferences vary across countries? 
 
As a result of the persistent migration crisis and Islamist terror attacks, a growing anti-
immigrant sentiment as well as islamophobia have taken hold in Europe. 
In some countries the refugee crisis sparked an outpouring of solidarity and many local 
volunteers together with central authorities were committed to making the newcomers 
arriving in their towns feel welcome. In other countries, however, the opposite happened and 
restrictive border policies combined with a toxic rhetoric have created an openly hostile 
environment for refugees and migrants. These anti-immigrant feelings are not distributed in 
an equal way across the countries. In this section it will be studied where these feelings were 
stronger before the beginning of the immigration crisis.  
 
There were taking into account the following countries: Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, 
Great Britain, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Hungary, 
Spain, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovenia and Ireland.  
Austria, nowadays is situated in the middle between the countries that are very positive to 
immigration like Germany, and those that are very contrary to new immigration waves like 
Hungary. For this reason Austria was chosen as the reference group.  
 
The results in Table 16 show that the other European countries considered, in comparison 
with Austria were less xenophobic to immigrants coming from other poor European countries, 
immigrants with same and different/race and ethnic group as the majority, unskilled workers 
coming from European and non-European countries and professional workers coming from 
outside Europe.  
 
More in detail the results indicate that Belgian natives in comparison with Austrian were more 
tolerant to immigrants coming from other poor European countries (0.0705, significant at 1% 
level), immigrants with same (0.0309, significant at 1% level) and different (0.0451, 
significant at 1% level) race/ethnic group and non-European unskilled workers (0.0732, 
significant at 5% level) but less tolerant to European professional works (-0.0612, significant 
at 10% level). For all the other categories of immigrants Belgian natives were indifferent.  
 
The Swiss natives in comparison with Austrian natives were extremely tolerant to immigrants 
of all categories except for the non-European unskilled workers to which were indifferent. In 
detail Swiss natives in comparison with Austrian natives, on average, would allow 0.0403 
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(significant at 5% level) more immigrants from poor European countries, 0.0745 (significant 
at 1% level) more immigrants from poor European countries 0.110 more immigrants with 
same and 0.0541 more with different race/ethnic group (both significant at 1% level), 0.0360 
more Muslims, 0.0896 more European professional workers (significant at 5% level) and 
0.0963 more non-European professional workers and 0.204 more European unskilled workers 
(both significant at 1% level). 
 
Switzerland's situation is almost identical to the one of Germany, Sweden and Slovenia. The 
difference with Germany and Sweden is that both were positive also on the entrance of non-
European unskilled workers whereas Switzerland was indifferent. The estimates of both 
countries in all the models are significant at 1% level and positive which specify that both 
countries, in comparison with Austria were more tolerant to immigration from all the 
categories of immigrants.  
 
The difference between Switzerland and Slovenia stays in the fact that this last one was 
indifferent to the entrance of European professional workers while Switzerland was totally 
positive.  The estimates for Slovenia are all significant at 1% level, excluded the one in the 
model “allow many Europeans” and “allow many Muslims” that are significant at 5% level, 
and “allow non-European professional workers” that is significant only at 10% level. In a few 
words Slovenian natives were more open than Austrian natives to the immigration of all types 
of individuals excluded the European professional workers and non-European unskilled 
workers to which are indifferent.  
 
France and Norway in comparison with Austria, were also very open to new waves of 
immigration. All types of immigrants excluded the non-European ones, were very welcome to 
France. The most wanted categories of immigrants were the non-European professional 
workers (0.191), European unskilled workers (0.188), the non-European unskilled workers 
(0.154), the European professional workers (0.132) and Muslims (0.131). Norway is very 
similar to France. The only exceptions are that European immigration was seen positive while 
the immigration of European professional workers was not considered important.  
 
In 2014 the countries that compared to Austria were really against all type of immigrates were 
Czech Republic and Hungary. Almost all the estimates of both are significant at 1% level and 
negatively correlated with the pro-immigration attitudes. 
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TABLE 16 – Multivariate Linear regression models (Variation across countries only for the 
models with all the variables included) 
 
COUNTRIES 
 
AUSTRIA 
 
         
BE 0.0274 0.0705*** 0.0309** 0.0451*** 0.0108 -0.0612* 0.0417 0.0219 0.0732** 
 
 
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0318) (0.0330) (0.0352) (0.0346) 
CH 0.0403** 0.0745*** 0.110*** 0.0541*** 0.0360** 0.0896** 0.0963*** 0.204*** 0.0520 
 
 
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0352) (0.0371) (0.0385) (0.0382) 
CZ -0.161***  -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.315*** -0.231*** -0.110*** -0.153*** -0.0589* 
 
 
(0.0173)  (0.0157) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0325) (0.0336) (0.0350) (0.0345) 
DE 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.134*** 0.207*** 0.159*** 0.0959*** 
 
 
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0293) (0.0306) (0.0317) (0.0315) 
DK -0.0756*** -0.00377 0.101*** 0.0311* -0.0143 0.000537 0.0818** 0.0994*** 0.0309 
 
 
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0341) (0.0362) (0.0380) (0.0376) 
EE -0.177*** -0.0689*** 0.0213 -0.0514*** -0.220*** -0.0729* -0.132*** 0.105*** -0.109*** 
 
 
(0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0378) (0.0362) (0.0367) (0.0414) 
ES 0.0518*** 0.0223 -0.0479*** 0.0444*** -0.0487*** -0.129*** -0.0387 -0.149*** 0.00169 
 
 
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0161) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0326) (0.0348) (0.0364) (0.0352) 
FI -0.168*** -0.144*** -0.0819*** -0.106*** -0.166*** -0.0463 -0.0873*** -0.186*** -0.173*** 
 
 
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0157) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0319) (0.0335) (0.0355) (0.0347) 
FR 0.0163 0.0640*** 0.0491*** 0.0642*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.154*** 
 
 
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0317) (0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0341) 
GB -0.0512*** -0.0219 -0.0446*** 0.0351** 0.0714*** 0.0228 0.141*** -0.0280 -0.0155 
 
 
(0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0323) (0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0345) 
HU -0.308*** -0.299*** -0.137*** -0.265*** -0.336*** -0.304*** -0.257*** -0.292*** -0.209*** 
 
 
(0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0345) (0.0365) (0.0374) (0.0375) 
IE -0.0370** -0.00299 -0.0807*** 0.00736 -0.0452*** -0.0233 -0.0792** -0.0303 -0.0440 
 
 
(0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0313) (0.0332) (0.0346) (0.0345) 
LT -0.112*** -0.0692*** -0.0241 0.0223 -0.214*** -0.117*** -0.0861** -0.0444 -0.0388 
 
 
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0348) (0.0375) (0.0383) (0.0373) 
NL -0.0151 -0.0207 -0.0137 0.0849*** -0.0171 -0.0998*** -0.0163 -0.130*** -0.0805** 
 
 
(0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0327) (0.0335) (0.0354) (0.0346) 
NO 0.119*** 0.130*** 0.0691*** 0.142*** 0.0889*** 0.0570 0.0668* 0.152*** 0.0782** 
 
 
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0348) (0.0367) (0.0387) (0.0371) 
PL 0.0313 0.105*** -0.0103 0.0378** -0.177*** 0.000726 0.0604 0.0569 0.0207 
 
 
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0353) (0.0387) (0.0391) (0.0379) 
PT 0.0526*** 0.0808*** 0.00558 0.0641*** -0.0342* -0.0178 0.133*** 0.0125 0.117*** 
 
 
(0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0360) (0.0383) (0.0404) (0.0400) 
SE 0.297*** 0.249*** 0.166*** 0.287*** 0.223*** 0.0738** 0.155*** 0.202*** 0.322*** 
 
 
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0337) (0.0353) (0.0379) (0.0370) 
SI 0.0460** 0.106*** 0.0694*** 0.112*** 0.0497** 0.0489 0.0765* 0.147*** -0.0667 
 (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0397) (0.0421) (0.0431) (0.0417) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finland, Great Britain, Ireland and Lithuania were mostly more xenophobic than Austria. All 
four countries were against the immigration of individuals from poor non-European countries, 
Muslims and non-European professional workers. Both Finland and Lithuania were also 
against the immigration of individuals from poor European countries. Finland in addition was 
against the immigration of individuals of same and different race ethnic group, and unskilled 
workers both from European and non-European countries. Lithuania instead was only against 
the immigration of European professional workers. Great Britain, excluded the previous 
categories was also intolerant to the immigrants of same and different race/ethnic group.  
 
The European immigrants, with respect to Austria, were more welcomed to Norway (0.105, 
significant at 1%), Poland (0.105, significant at 1%) and Portugal (0.0808, significant at 1%) 
but were not very good received in Estonia.  
 
The non-European immigrants instead with respect to Austria were unwelcomed in Denmark 
(-0.0756) and Estonia (-0.177) but welcomed in Spain (0.0518), Norway (0.119) and Portugal 
(0.0526).  
 
Belong to the same race/ethnic group was more important and had a positive impact on pro-
immigration attitudes in Denmark and Norway but had a negative impact in Spain. On the 
contrary belong to a minority in terms of race and ethnic group had a negative impact on pro-
immigration attitudes in Estonian while in Denmark, Spain, Norway, Portugal, Poland and the 
Netherlands had a very positive impact.  
 
Muslims in comparison with Austria are were welcomed in Spain (-0.0487), Estonia (-0.220), 
Poland (-0.177) and Portugal (-0.0342).  
 
Compared to Austria European professional workers were not very good received in Estonia 
(-0.0729), Spain (0.129) and the Netherlands (-0.0998) while the non-European professional 
workers were more welcomed in Denmark, Norway and Portugal but unwelcomed in Estonia 
than in Austria. 
 
The situation is very similar also for the European and non-European unskilled workers. Both 
were more welcomed in Norway than in Austria. The European ones were welcomed also in 
Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands while unwelcomed in Spain. Whereas the non-
European ones were welcomed also in Portugal but very unwelcome in Estonia and the 
Netherlands.  
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In conclusion, the countries that in 2014 were more open than Austria to new waves of 
immigration were: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden and Portugal. Moreover the countries that were totally contrary to accept 
new immigrants were: Czech Republic, Hungary, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Estonia, 
Finland, Lithuania and in part the Netherlands.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The European society in 2014 was much more open and trustworthy with respect to 
immigration than the current one. The analysis results specifies that in 2014, for the majority 
of natives, it did not matter if the immigrants were unskilled or professional workers, Muslim 
or Christian, European or non-European. They were open mostly to any type of immigration.  
In the specific case, the young natives were definitely more open to new waves of 
immigration than the old ones. These last ones were intolerant especially to the unskilled 
workers. Men on average were more tolerant than women in particularly to Muslims 
immigration and to European workers immigration. Natives with a higher education 
compared to the ones with a lower education were less xenophobic with respect to any 
category of immigrants. Natives that were working for their family business and natives that 
where unemployed for most of their life, were much more open to immigrants than the 
employees. Religious natives in general were more tolerant to immigrants than the Catholics. 
Compared to the Catholic religion only Protestant and Orthodox religions were more 
xenophobic.  
 
The individuals that agreed with the claims that immigrants had a negative impact on the 
country’s economy, took jobs away, paid less taxes than the benefits that used, made the 
country less open to new ideas and cultures and made the country a worse place to live, were 
more likely to not support a raise in immigration. The percentage of native that agreed with all 
these claims was not very high so the major part of the population thought that immigration 
had a positive effect on both aspect, economic and non-economic.  
 
The countries that in 2014 were more open to new waves of immigration were Belgium, 
Germany, France and Sweden.  
 
The final conclusions, derived from analyzing the data provided by the European Social 
Survey shows that even before the migrant crisis hit Europe the countries that were already 
implementing “open-border” immigration policies had already presented signs of social unrest 
and general aversion to those policies. As a matter of fact this very same countries were the 
ones that close their borders after the events of 2015.  
 
However, the interpretation behind these policies remains confusionary, the German 
Chancellor herself declared before the migrant crisis “that multiculturalism has failed”. Also 
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many European countries already had data on immigration outcome and integration that 
should have pointed towards that same results. The one analyzed in this work are in line with 
the aforementioned tendency. The data that will be available in the future, which will cover 
the peak of the migrant crisis, will most certainly confirm this tendency.  
 
From an objective prospective the European integration of the migrants that came in the 
period analyzed is not successful. The current economic state of the European continent is a 
negative factor is a negative factor for integration. The costs that many European countries 
had to endure as aftermath of both the financial crisis, the Sovereign debt crisis and the 
previous strife needed to conform with the Maastricht parameters did not put the European 
nations, especially those in the south and the east in a favorable position for the integration of 
such divers and massive inflow of migrants.  
 
As a result the immigration policy became a major factor in undermining the validity and 
efficacy of the European Union project in the eyes of the population of Europe.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE 11 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic variables 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
reg 
AM_Musl AM_prof 
Eu 
AM_prof- 
nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
          
Age  -7.52e-05 0.00254*** 0.00159** 0.00168** 0.000585 0.000500 -0.00170 0.00553*** 0.00398*** 
 
 
(0.000742) (0.000720) (0.000671) (0.000713) (0.000705) (0.00137) (0.00139) (0.00143) (0.00141) 
age2 -3.10e-05*** -5.99e-05*** -3.66e-05*** -4.94e-05*** -4.77e-05*** -1.98e-05 -1.28e-05 -5.62e-05*** -6.39e-05*** 
 
 
(7.33e-06) (7.14e-06) (6.65e-06) (7.06e-06) (6.99e-06) (1.35e-05) (1.38e-05) (1.42e-05) (1.40e-05) 
Male -0.00746 -0.0147*** -0.00241 -0.00471 0.00714 0.0165* 0.00696 0.0101 0.00826 
 
 
(0.00540) (0.00520) (0.00486) (0.00516) (0.00509) (0.00984) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0101) 
Citizens 0.0161 0.0248 -0.0155 0.00677 0.0248 -0.00260 -0.0437 0.0943 -0.00219 
 
 
 
(0.0358) (0.0353) (0.0329) (0.0350) (0.0345) (0.0757) (0.0667) (0.0652) (0.0682) 
Constant 0.536*** 0.433*** 0.694*** 0.524*** 0.495*** 0.673*** 0.707*** 0.120 0.239*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0377) (0.0401) (0.0395) (0.0840) (0.0775) (0.0755) (0.0782) 
          
Observations 
 
30,822 32,757 32,889 32,881 32,478 8,191 8,197 8,317 8,023 
R-squared 0.100 0.117 0.092 0.120 0.160 0.092 0.104 0.108 0.089 
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TABLE 12 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic and socio-economic 
variables 
 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_profEu 
 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk-
nonEu 
Age  -0.00338*** -0.000745 -0.00248*** -0.00224*** -0.00384*** -0.00339** -0.00580*** 0.00282* 0.000813 
 
 
(0.000819) (0.000799) (0.000743) (0.000789) (0.000776) (0.00152) (0.00155) (0.00159) (0.00156) 
age2 9.41e-06 -2.00e-05** 1.25e-05* -1.52e-06 5.71e-06 2.72e-05* 3.42e-05** -2.08e-05 -2.63e-05* 
 
 
(8.05e-06) (7.87e-06) (7.31e-06) (7.76e-06) (7.64e-06) (1.49e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.53e-05) 
Male -0.00207 -0.0102** 0.000821 0.000244 0.0125** 0.0224** 0.0109 0.0132 0.0127 
 
 
(0.00539) (0.00520) (0.00484) (0.00514) (0.00504) (0.00981) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0101) 
Citizens 0.00206 0.00115 -0.0277 -0.0163 0.00509 -0.0220 -0.0624 0.0758 -0.0105 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0329) (0.0349) (0.0341) (0.0746) (0.0681) (0.0644) (0.0682) 
Primary 
education 
-0.0838*** -0.0822*** -0.136*** -0.120*** -0.122*** -0.112*** -0.101*** -0.0856*** -0.0715*** 
 
 
(0.00992) (0.00985) (0.00914) (0.00972) (0.00956) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0191) 
Tertiary educ 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.146*** 0.175*** 0.199*** 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 
 
 
(0.00662) (0.00645) (0.00601) (0.00638) (0.00625) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0126) 
Other -0.0371 -0.0825 -0.0361 -0.0603 -0.00304 0.0147 0.140 -0.136 -0.0290 
 
MAIN 
WORKING 
CONDITION:  
(0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0471) (0.0500) (0.0493) (0.0887) (0.105) (0.116) (0.0938) 
Self-employed 0.00506 0.0111 0.0115 0.00632 0.00341 0.00257 0.0102 0.0233 0.00366 
 
 
(0.00883) (0.00854) (0.00796) (0.00847) (0.00829) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0159) 
Working for own 
family business 
-0.0276 -0.0169 0.00391 -0.0577*** -0.0187 -0.0148 0.0309 0.0102 -0.0523 
 
 
(0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0382) (0.0375) (0.0402) (0.0395) 
Unemployed 0.0226** 0.0257** 0.0138 0.0251** 0.0177* 0.0148 -0.00448 0.0452** 0.0142 
 
 
(0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0217) 
          
Constant 0.580*** 0.488*** 0.757*** 0.589*** 0.564*** 0.738*** 0.777*** 0.154** 0.277*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0385) (0.0409) (0.0400) (0.0845) (0.0806) (0.0773) (0.0799) 
          
Observations 
 
30,646 32,557 32,686 32,676 32,273 8,135 8,137 8,273 7,989 
R-squared 0.123 0.138 0.116 0.146 0.192 0.117 0.124 0.133 0.110 
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TABLE 13 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic and 
non-economic variables 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_prof 
Eu 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
Age -0.00326*** -0.000149 -0.00235*** -0.00205** -0.00379*** -0.00367** -0.00630*** 0.00305* 0.000567 
 
 
(0.000870) (0.000852) (0.000784) (0.000838) (0.000826) (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00171) (0.00167) 
age2 1.11e-05 -2.25e-05*** 1.31e-05* -1.17e-07 8.11e-06 3.16e-05** 4.12e-05** -2.09e-05 -2.10e-05 
 
 
(8.52e-06) (8.36e-06) (7.69e-06) (8.22e-06) (8.10e-06) (1.56e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.65e-05) 
Male -0.00161 -0.00873 0.00358 0.000383 0.0118** 0.0297*** 0.00765 0.0122 0.0101 
 
 
(0.00567) (0.00548) (0.00505) (0.00540) (0.00530) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0107) 
Citizens  -0.0402 -0.0110 -0.0615* -0.0265 -0.00155 -0.0739 -0.112 0.00764 -0.0127 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0355) (0.0380) (0.0372) (0.0796) (0.0777) (0.0710) (0.0733) 
Primary education -0.0881*** -0.0905*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.111*** -0.0960*** -0.0674*** 
 
 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00979) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0208) 
Tertiary educ 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.143*** 0.176*** 0.202*** 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.183*** 0.162*** 
 
 
(0.00681) (0.00665) (0.00613) (0.00656) (0.00644) (0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0130) 
Other -0.0338 -0.0861 -0.0319 -0.0457 0.00205 0.0704 0.103 -0.100 -0.0211 
 
MAIN WORKING 
CONDITION  
(0.0551) (0.0553) (0.0507) (0.0542) (0.0537) (0.0996) (0.107) (0.124) (0.103) 
Self-employed 0.0104 0.0164* 0.0161* 0.0107 0.0101 0.0127 0.0257 0.0283 0.00715 
 
 
(0.00918) (0.00892) (0.00823) (0.00881) (0.00864) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0167) 
Working for own 
family business  
-0.0315 -0.0151 0.00573 -0.0573*** -0.0112 -0.0207 0.0476 0.0445 -0.0376 
 
 
(0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0388) (0.0388) (0.0430) (0.0421) 
Unemployed 0.0299** 0.0311** 0.0242** 0.0332*** 0.0245** 0.0286 0.00110 0.0507** 0.000707 
 
 
(0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0245) (0.0243) 
political affiliation 
with extreme right  
-0.108*** -0.112*** -0.0489*** -0.105*** -0.113*** -0.0700*** -0.0589*** -0.0541*** -0.0926*** 
 
 
(0.00829) (0.00800) (0.00736) (0.00788) (0.00774) (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0160) 
Very close to 
country 
-0.00215 -0.0251** 0.0326*** -0.00635 0.000289 0.0151 0.0199 -0.0387* -0.0183 
 
RELIGION:  
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.00949) (0.0102) (0.00997) (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0196) 
Protestant  0.0127 0.0110 0.0127 0.0150 0.0201** 0.0224 0.00658 -0.0345* 0.0140 
 
 
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.00953) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0202) 
Eastern Orthodox -0.0948*** -0.0993*** 0.0130 -0.0415 -0.0439 0.114* -0.0153 -0.175*** 0.0183 
 
 
(0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0279) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0633) (0.0553) (0.0614) (0.0566) 
Other Christian 
denomination 
0.132*** 0.127*** 0.0580** 0.115*** 0.104*** -0.0438 -0.0599 0.0314 0.126** 
 
 
(0.0300) (0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0278) (0.0544) (0.0612) (0.0538) (0.0560) 
Jewish 0.0485 0.0194 -0.0142 0.0547 0.163* 0.199 0.0255 0.0174 0.258 
 
 
(0.0988) (0.0964) (0.0890) (0.0952) (0.0951) (0.215) (0.170) (0.189) (0.182) 
Islamic 0.0550 0.0994*** 0.0632* 0.152*** 0.291*** 0.0122 0.166** 0.115* 0.152** 
 
 
(0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0325) (0.0348) (0.0342) (0.0659) (0.0661) (0.0682) (0.0724) 
Eastern religions  0.138** 0.133** 0.0845 0.192*** 0.182*** 0.135 0.236* 0.172* 0.226** 
 
 
(0.0574) (0.0560) (0.0517) (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.125) (0.121) (0.102) (0.0938) 
Other non-
Christian religions  
0.144** 0.177*** 0.0984* 0.101* 0.129** 0.00692 0.0523 -0.0381 0.178* 
 
 
(0.0592) (0.0568) (0.0528) (0.0565) (0.0548) (0.130) (0.0991) (0.120) (0.100) 
Atheist  0.0250*** 0.0299*** -0.000212 0.0246*** 0.0363*** 0.00197 0.00345 -0.0113 0.0465*** 
 
 
 
(0.00782) (0.00758) (0.00698) (0.00747) (0.00733) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0146) 
Constant 0.621*** 0.507*** 0.764*** 0.595*** 0.560*** 0.793*** 0.829*** 0.260*** 0.292*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0420) (0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0915) (0.0912) (0.0859) (0.0868) 
          
Observations 
 
27,456 29,208 29,308 29,304 28,993 7,307 7,317 7,372 7,165 
R-squared 0.131 0.149 0.120 0.155 0.207 0.127 0.129 0.141 0.123 
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TABLE 14 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic, non-
economic variables and economic attitudes variables 
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu 
 
AM_non 
Eu 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_prof 
Eu 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk-
nonEu 
Age  -0.00173** 0.00140* -0.00166** -0.000556 -0.00241*** -0.00266* -0.00496*** 0.00439** 0.00248 
 
 
(0.000857) (0.000844) (0.000774) (0.000824) (0.000821) (0.00159) (0.00165) (0.00171) (0.00169) 
age2 9.29e-07 -3.28e-05*** 9.89e-06 -1.03e-05 -3.18e-07 2.42e-05 3.22e-05** -2.98e-05* -3.62e-05** 
 
 
(8.45e-06) (8.33e-06) (7.64e-06) (8.12e-06) (8.10e-06) (1.57e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.67e-05) 
Male -0.000549 -0.00453 0.00485 0.00155 0.0179*** 0.0303*** 0.0130 0.0240** 0.0106 
 
 
(0.00554) (0.00539) (0.00494) (0.00526) (0.00523) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0108) 
Citizens -0.0264 -0.00294 -0.0670* -0.0284 0.0117 -0.103 -0.136* -0.0240 0.0547 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0344) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0775) (0.0768) (0.0706) (0.0727) 
Primary 
education 
-0.0498*** -0.0573*** -0.111*** -0.0914*** -0.102*** -0.111*** -0.0791*** -0.0621*** -0.0476** 
 
 
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.00971) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0196) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0212) 
Tertiary educ 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.0904*** 0.118*** 0.152*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.141*** 0.121*** 
 
 
(0.00668) (0.00656) (0.00602) (0.00641) (0.00637) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0131) 
Other -0.101* -0.131** -0.0985** -0.112** -0.0631 0.00745 0.0763 -0.176 0.00383 
 
MAIN WORKING 
CONDITION:  
(0.0542) (0.0547) (0.0499) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.101) (0.108) (0.124) (0.103) 
Self-employed 0.00579 0.0105 0.0106 0.00243 0.00807 0.0110 0.0284 0.0183 0.00503 
 
 
(0.00896) (0.00878) (0.00805) (0.00857) (0.00852) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0169) 
Working for own 
family business 
-0.0382* -0.0205 0.00501 -0.0644*** -0.00911 -0.00219 0.0325 0.104** -0.0192 
 
 
(0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0384) (0.0382) (0.0448) (0.0431) 
Unemployed 0.0198 0.0229* 0.0166 0.0243** 0.0182 0.0187 0.00111 0.0429* 0.00590 
 
 
(0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0230) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0245) 
political 
affiliation with 
extreme right 
-0.0621*** -0.0686*** -0.0165** -0.0605*** -0.0735*** -0.0271* -0.0277* -0.0167 -0.0553*** 
 
 
(0.00816) (0.00791) (0.00725) (0.00772) (0.00768) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0163) 
Nationalist -0.0198* -0.0394*** 0.0124 -0.0259*** -0.0166* -0.00640 -0.000913 -0.0457** -0.0304 
 
RELIGION:  
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00927) (0.00987) (0.00981) (0.0186) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0196) 
Protestant -0.00302 -0.00245 0.000475 0.00395 0.00591 0.0176 -0.000386 -0.0403** 0.00221 
 
 
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00928) (0.00987) (0.00981) (0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0202) 
Eastern 
Orthodox 
-0.101*** -0.117*** -0.00772 -0.0537* -0.0548* 0.133** -0.00463 -0.207*** -0.0406 
 
 
(0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0275) (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0632) (0.0564) (0.0616) (0.0576) 
Other Christian 
denomination 
0.120*** 0.111*** 0.0548** 0.104*** 0.0966*** -0.0264 -0.0374 0.00837 0.0948 
 
 
(0.0298) (0.0290) (0.0267) (0.0283) (0.0281) (0.0545) (0.0614) (0.0554) (0.0579) 
Jewish 0.0426 0.00501 0.0133 0.0679 0.173* 0.196 0.0719 -0.0292 0.248 
 
 
(0.100) (0.0980) (0.0900) (0.0958) (0.0949) (0.237) (0.163) (0.199) (0.194) 
Islamic -0.00553 0.0409 0.0105 0.0913*** 0.232*** 0.00351 0.113* 0.0570 0.129* 
 
 
(0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0312) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0638) (0.0647) (0.0657) (0.0731) 
Eastern religions 0.0893* 0.0893* 0.0476 0.155*** 0.145*** 0.0878 0.205* 0.139 0.220** 
 
 
(0.0542) (0.0535) (0.0491) (0.0527) (0.0515) (0.119) (0.116) (0.0980) (0.0931) 
Other non-
Christian 
religions 
0.127** 0.164*** 0.0847* 0.103* 0.130** 0.0496 0.0361 -0.0290 0.128 
 
 
(0.0567) (0.0547) (0.0506) (0.0538) (0.0530) (0.124) (0.0971) (0.116) (0.1000) 
Atheist 0.0182** 0.0219*** -0.00328 0.0200*** 0.0295*** 0.00832 -0.000132 -0.0201 0.0406*** 
 
 
ECONOMIC 
ATTITUDES:  
(0.00763) (0.00745) (0.00684) (0.00727) (0.00723) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0147) 
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Bad for the 
economy 
-0.241*** -0.211*** -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.173*** -0.153*** -0.177*** -0.0893*** -0.131*** 
 (0.00876) (0.00837) (0.00768) (0.00817) (0.00813) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0167) 
Generally take 
out more 
-0.127*** -0.131*** -0.103*** -0.136*** -0.152*** -0.0972*** -0.146*** -0.121*** -0.102*** 
 
 
(0.00834) (0.00803) (0.00737) (0.00783) (0.00779) (0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0158) 
Take jobs away -0.0919*** -0.0632*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.0733*** -0.159*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.0440** 
 
 
(0.00924) (0.00878) (0.00805) (0.00857) (0.00853) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0172) 
Extremely 
important educ 
-0.0528*** -0.0451*** -0.0214*** -0.0445*** -0.0430*** -9.91e-05 -0.0171 -0.0636*** -0.0468*** 
 
 
(0.00654) (0.00634) (0.00582) (0.00619) (0.00616) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0125) 
Extremely 
important work 
skills 
-0.101*** -0.123*** -0.0513*** -0.0953*** -0.113*** -0.0283** -0.0423*** -0.126*** -0.125*** 
 
 
 
(0.00643) (0.00623) (0.00572) (0.00608) (0.00605) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0124) 
Constant 0.776*** 0.660*** 0.899*** 0.758*** 0.704*** 0.927*** 0.964*** 0.442*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0445) (0.0409) (0.0436) (0.0433) (0.0898) (0.0908) (0.0856) (0.0867) 
          
Observations 
 
25,597 27,212 27,253 27,254 27,047 6,823 6,782 6,865 6,678 
R-squared 0.226 0.236 0.214 0.255 0.283 0.199 0.201 0.208 0.182 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 15 – Multivariate Linear regression models for demographic socio-economic, non-
economic variables and economic and non-economic attitudes variables 
 
VARIABLES AM_Eu AM_nonEu 
 
AM_same 
_reg 
AM_diff 
_reg 
AM_Musl AM_profEu 
 
AM_prof 
-nonEu 
AM_unsk 
Eu 
AM_unsk 
-nonEu 
Age of respondent -0.00139 0.00192** -0.00141* -2.88e-05 -0.00171** -0.00245 -0.00366** 0.00507*** 0.00307* 
 
 
(0.000871) (0.000860) (0.000783) (0.000834) (0.000832) (0.00160) (0.00168) (0.00176) (0.00172) 
age2 8.37e-07 -3.50e-05*** 1.09e-05 -1.13e-05 -3.36e-06 2.43e-05 2.27e-05 -3.26e-05* -3.93e-05** 
 
 
(8.60e-06) (8.51e-06) (7.75e-06) (8.25e-06) (8.24e-06) (1.58e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.71e-05) 
Male 0.000945 -0.00316 0.00690 0.00317 0.0203*** 0.0303*** 0.0125 0.0251** 0.0111 
 
 
(0.00559) (0.00546) (0.00497) (0.00530) (0.00528) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0110) 
Citizens -0.0265 0.00146 -0.0739** -0.0356 0.0139 -0.0647 -0.137* -0.0702 0.0530 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0345) (0.0367) (0.0367) (0.0780) (0.0786) (0.0719) (0.0725) 
Primary education -0.0371*** -0.0504*** -0.0985*** -0.0826*** -0.0922*** -0.0934*** -0.0674*** -0.0672*** -0.0433** 
 
 
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00983) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0199) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0217) 
Tertiary educ 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.0816*** 0.107*** 0.143*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.140*** 0.116*** 
 
 
(0.00674) (0.00665) (0.00605) (0.00644) (0.00643) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0134) 
Other -0.0873 -0.122** -0.0898* -0.113** -0.0886* -0.00740 0.0598 -0.185 0.0239 
 
MAIN WORKING 
CONDITION:  
(0.0548) (0.0556) (0.0503) (0.0535) (0.0536) (0.0994) (0.111) (0.124) (0.109) 
Self-employed 0.00436 0.0124 0.0124 0.00510 0.00885 0.0154 0.0231 0.0193 -0.000520 
 
 
(0.00905) (0.00891) (0.00811) (0.00864) (0.00861) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0171) 
Working for own family 
business  
-0.0314 -0.0151 0.00989 -0.0554*** 0.000652 -0.00188 0.0398 0.111** -0.0202 
 
 
(0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0457) (0.0435) 
Unemployed 0.0201 0.0248** 0.0209* 0.0246** 0.0178 0.00863 0.0154 0.0370 0.00317 
 
 
(0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0233) (0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0253) 
political affiliation with 
extreme right  
-0.0500*** -0.0580*** -0.00538 -0.0475*** -0.0602*** -0.0199 -0.0102 -0.00346 -0.0449*** 
 
 
(0.00827) (0.00805) (0.00733) (0.00780) (0.00778) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0166) 
Nationalist  -0.0304*** -0.0482*** 0.00365 -0.0348*** -0.0224** -0.0140 -0.00973 -0.0534** -0.0363* 
 
RELIGION:  
(0.0103) (0.0102) (0.00928) (0.00988) (0.00986) (0.0188) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0198) 
Protestant 0.000672 -0.000233 0.00249 0.00662 0.00762 0.0182 0.00119 -0.0377* 0.00571 
 
 
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00929) (0.00988) (0.00986) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0205) 
Eastern Orthodox -0.119*** -0.130*** -0.0440 -0.0811*** -0.0647** 0.0892 -0.00160 -0.274*** -0.0276 
 
 
(0.0319) (0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0699) (0.0591) (0.0652) (0.0603) 
Other Christian denomination 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.0559** 0.105*** 0.0928*** -0.0483 -0.0531 0.0179 0.0998* 
 
 
(0.0301) (0.0294) (0.0269) (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0553) (0.0620) (0.0564) (0.0592) 
Jewish 0.0385 0.00663 0.0309 0.0741 0.179* 0.172 0.141 -0.0454 0.285 
 
 
(0.0990) (0.0997) (0.0909) (0.0968) (0.0962) (0.235) (0.174) (0.198) (0.193) 
Islamic -0.0177 0.0260 0.00688 0.0811** 0.222*** -0.0129 0.105 0.0471 0.133* 
 
 
(0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0312) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0639) (0.0647) (0.0669) (0.0738) 
Eastern religions 0.0922* 0.0917* 0.0506 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.0980 0.210* 0.129 0.210** 
 
 
(0.0539) (0.0535) (0.0488) (0.0523) (0.0512) (0.118) (0.115) (0.100) (0.0927) 
Other non-Christian religions  0.149*** 0.185*** 0.106** 0.111** 0.125** 0.0273 0.00891 -0.0240 0.125 
 
 
(0.0570) (0.0556) (0.0510) (0.0543) (0.0536) (0.129) (0.0986) (0.119) (0.0996) 
Atheist  0.0216*** 0.0213*** -0.00445 0.0184** 0.0275*** 0.00478 0.00644 -0.0174 0.0432*** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
(0.00773) (0.00758) (0.00690) (0.00734) (0.00732) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0150) 
Bad for the economy -0.159*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.103*** -0.0923*** -0.112*** -0.0452** -0.0789*** 
 
 
(0.00978) (0.00943) (0.00860) (0.00915) (0.00913) (0.0176) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0189) 
Generally take out more -0.0764*** -0.0830*** -0.0635*** -0.0808*** -0.0907*** -0.0658*** -0.105*** -0.0904*** -0.0491*** 
 
 
 
(0.00887) (0.00858) (0.00781) (0.00831) (0.00829) (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0169) 
Take jobs away -0.0528*** -0.0282*** -0.0818*** -0.0637*** -0.0286*** -0.129*** -0.0662*** -0.0843*** -0.0117 
 
 
(0.00958) (0.00914) (0.00833) (0.00887) (0.00885) (0.0170) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0180) 
Extremely important educ -0.0424*** -0.0350*** -0.0125** -0.0303*** -0.0276*** 0.0114 -0.00349 -0.0570*** -0.0403*** 
 
 
(0.00666) (0.00649) (0.00591) (0.00630) (0.00628) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0129) 
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Extremely important work 
skills  
-0.0885*** -0.109*** -0.0340*** -0.0750*** -0.0960*** -0.0171 -0.0253** -0.123*** -0.116*** 
 
NON-ECONOIMC 
ATTITUDES:  
(0.00660) (0.00643) (0.00585) (0.00623) (0.00621) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0127) 
Extremely important 
Christian background 
-0.00848 -0.0366*** -0.0357*** -0.0646*** -0.0732*** -0.0518*** -0.0411** 0.00613 -0.00878 
 
 
(0.0103) (0.00980) (0.00893) (0.00950) (0.00946) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0196) 
Extremely important be white -0.0691*** -0.0320*** -0.0807*** -0.0590*** -0.0348*** -0.0729*** -0.109*** 0.0148 0.00903 
 
 
(0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0237) 
Crime problems made worse -0.0818*** -0.0896*** -0.0391*** -0.0911*** -0.122*** -0.0505*** -0.0654*** -0.0729*** -0.104*** 
 
 
(0.00739) (0.00721) (0.00657) (0.00699) (0.00698) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Worse place to live -0.109*** -0.0822*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.0833*** -0.107*** -0.0870*** -0.0112 -0.0702*** 
 
 
(0.0110) (0.0106) (0.00965) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0210) 
Cultural life undermined -0.0918*** -0.0735*** -0.0812*** -0.0900*** -0.0633*** -0.0216 -0.0585*** -0.0791*** -0.0432** 
 
 
(0.0110) (0.0106) (0.00963) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0211) 
Constant 0.799*** 0.672*** 0.921*** 0.778*** 0.719*** 0.916*** 0.962*** 0.493*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0411) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0905) (0.0928) (0.0875) (0.0869) 
          
Observations 
 
24,536 26,061 26,082 26,085 25,924 6,546 6,505 6,558 6,392 
R-squared 0.243 0.249 0.232 0.275 0.300 0.214 0.215 0.216 0.193 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Original Tables: 
Table 17 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_poor_Eu 
-demo 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco-atti 
AM_poor_Eu 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent -7.52e-05 -0.00338*** -0.00326*** -0.00173** -0.00139 
 (0.000742) (0.000819) (0.000870) (0.000857) (0.000871) 
age2 -3.10e-05*** 9.41e-06 1.11e-05 9.29e-07 8.37e-07 
 (7.33e-06) (8.05e-06) (8.52e-06) (8.45e-06) (8.60e-06) 
Male -0.00746 -0.00207 -0.00161 -0.000549 0.000945 
 (0.00540) (0.00539) (0.00567) (0.00554) (0.00559) 
Citizens 0.0161 0.00206 -0.0402 -0.0264 -0.0265 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0387) (0.0374) (0.0375) 
Primary education  -0.0838*** -0.0881*** -0.0498*** -0.0371*** 
  (0.00992) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
Tertiary educ  0.169*** 0.168*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 
  (0.00662) (0.00681) (0.00668) (0.00674) 
Other  -0.0371 -0.0338 -0.101* -0.0873 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION: 
 (0.0508) (0.0551) (0.0542) (0.0548) 
Self-employed  0.00506 0.0104 0.00579 0.00436 
  (0.00883) (0.00918) (0.00896) (0.00905) 
Working for own family business  -0.0276 -0.0315 -0.0382* -0.0314 
  (0.0204) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0212) 
Unemployed  0.0226** 0.0299** 0.0198 0.0201 
 
 
 (0.0115) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0129) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.108*** -0.0621*** -0.0500*** 
   (0.00829) (0.00816) (0.00827) 
Very close to country   -0.00215 -0.0198* -0.0304*** 
 
RELIGION:  
  (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0103) 
Protestant   0.0127 -0.00302 0.000672 
   (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.0948*** -0.101*** -0.119*** 
   (0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0319) 
Other Christian denomination   0.132*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 
   (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0301) 
Jewish   0.0485 0.0426 0.0385 
   (0.0988) (0.100) (0.0990) 
Islamic   0.0550 -0.00553 -0.0177 
   (0.0355) (0.0340) (0.0341) 
Eastern religions   0.138** 0.0893* 0.0922* 
   (0.0574) (0.0542) (0.0539) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.144** 0.127** 0.149*** 
   (0.0592) (0.0567) (0.0570) 
Atheist   0.0250*** 0.0182** 0.0216*** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.00782) (0.00763) (0.00773) 
Bad for the economy    -0.241*** -0.159*** 
    (0.00876) (0.00978) 
Generally take out more    -0.127*** -0.0764*** 
    (0.00834) (0.00887) 
Take jobs away    -0.0919*** -0.0528*** 
    (0.00924) (0.00958) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0528*** -0.0424*** 
    (0.00654) (0.00666) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.101*** -0.0885*** 
 
NON-ECONOIMC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.00643) (0.00660) 
Extremely important Christian background     -0.00848 
     (0.0103) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0691*** 
     (0.0126) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0818*** 
     (0.00739) 
Worse place to live     -0.109*** 
     (0.0110) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0918*** 
     (0.0110) 
Constant 0.536*** 0.580*** 0.621*** 0.776*** 0.799*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0419) (0.0459) (0.0447) (0.0450) 
      
Observations 30,822 30,646 27,456 25,597 24,536 
R-squared 0.100 0.123 0.131 0.226 0.243 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 18 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS FROM POOR NON-
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_poor_nonEu 
-demo 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.00254*** -0.000745 -0.000149 0.00140* 0.00192** 
 (0.000720) (0.000799) (0.000852) (0.000844) (0.000860) 
age2 -5.99e-05*** -2.00e-05** -2.25e-05*** -3.28e-05*** -3.50e-05*** 
 (7.14e-06) (7.87e-06) (8.36e-06) (8.33e-06) (8.51e-06) 
Male -0.0147*** -0.0102** -0.00873 -0.00453 -0.00316 
 (0.00520) (0.00520) (0.00548) (0.00539) (0.00546) 
Citizens 0.0248 0.00115 -0.0110 -0.00294 0.00146 
 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0384) (0.0374) (0.0377) 
Primary education  -0.0822*** -0.0905*** -0.0573*** -0.0504*** 
  (0.00985) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0108) 
Tertiary educ  0.168*** 0.168*** 0.116*** 0.108*** 
  (0.00645) (0.00665) (0.00656) (0.00665) 
Other  -0.0825 -0.0861 -0.131** -0.122** 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITIONS:  
 (0.0508) (0.0553) (0.0547) (0.0556) 
Self-employed  0.0111 0.0164* 0.0105 0.0124 
  (0.00854) (0.00892) (0.00878) (0.00891) 
Working for own family business  -0.0169 -0.0151 -0.0205 -0.0151 
  (0.0201) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0211) 
Unemployed  0.0257** 0.0311** 0.0229* 0.0248** 
 
 
 (0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0125) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.112*** -0.0686*** -0.0580*** 
   (0.00800) (0.00791) (0.00805) 
Very close to country   -0.0251** -0.0394*** -0.0482*** 
 
RELIGION:  
  (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Protestant   0.0110 -0.00245 -0.000233 
   (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.0993*** -0.117*** -0.130*** 
   (0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0318) 
Other Christian denomination   0.127*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 
   (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0294) 
Jewish   0.0194 0.00501 0.00663 
   (0.0964) (0.0980) (0.0997) 
Islamic   0.0994*** 0.0409 0.0260 
   (0.0355) (0.0342) (0.0344) 
Eastern religions   0.133** 0.0893* 0.0917* 
   (0.0560) (0.0535) (0.0535) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.177*** 0.164*** 0.185*** 
   (0.0568) (0.0547) (0.0556) 
Atheist   0.0299*** 0.0219*** 0.0213*** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.00758) (0.00745) (0.00758) 
Bad for the economy    -0.211*** -0.141*** 
    (0.00837) (0.00943) 
Generally take out more    -0.131*** -0.0830*** 
    (0.00803) (0.00858) 
Take jobs away    -0.0632*** -0.0282*** 
    (0.00878) (0.00914) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0451*** -0.0350*** 
    (0.00634) (0.00649) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.123*** -0.109*** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.00623) (0.00643) 
Extremely important Christian background     -0.0366*** 
     (0.00980) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0320*** 
     (0.0117) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0896*** 
     (0.00721) 
Worse place to live     -0.0822*** 
     (0.0106) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0735*** 
     (0.0106) 
Constant 0.433*** 0.488*** 0.507*** 0.660*** 0.672*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0413) (0.0455) (0.0445) (0.0451) 
      
Observations 32,757 32,557 29,208 27,212 26,061 
R-squared 0.117 0.138 0.149 0.236 0.249 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 19 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF SAME 
RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_same_reg 
-demo 
AM_same_reg 
-eco 
AM_same_reg 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_same_reg 
-eco-atti 
AM_same_reg 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.00159** -0.00248*** -0.00235*** -0.00166** -0.00141* 
 (0.000671) (0.000743) (0.000784) (0.000774) (0.000783) 
age2 -3.66e-05*** 1.25e-05* 1.31e-05* 9.89e-06 1.09e-05 
 (6.65e-06) (7.31e-06) (7.69e-06) (7.64e-06) (7.75e-06) 
Male -0.00241 0.000821 0.00358 0.00485 0.00690 
 (0.00486) (0.00484) (0.00505) (0.00494) (0.00497) 
Citizens -0.0155 -0.0277 -0.0615* -0.0670* -0.0739** 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0355) (0.0344) (0.0345) 
Primary education  -0.136*** -0.142*** -0.111*** -0.0985*** 
  (0.00914) (0.00979) (0.00971) (0.00983) 
Tertiary educ  0.146*** 0.143*** 0.0904*** 0.0816*** 
  (0.00601) (0.00613) (0.00602) (0.00605) 
Other  -0.0361 -0.0319 -0.0985** -0.0898* 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:  
 (0.0471) (0.0507) (0.0499) (0.0503) 
Self-employed  0.0115 0.0161* 0.0106 0.0124 
  (0.00796) (0.00823) (0.00805) (0.00811) 
Working for own family business  0.00391 0.00573 0.00501 0.00989 
  (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0192) 
Unemployed  0.0138 0.0242** 0.0166 0.0209* 
 
 
 (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0114) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.0489*** -0.0165** -0.00538 
   (0.00736) (0.00725) (0.00733) 
Very close to country   0.0326*** 0.0124 0.00365 
 
RELIGION:  
  (0.00949) (0.00927) (0.00928) 
Protestant   0.0127 0.000475 0.00249 
   (0.00953) (0.00928) (0.00929) 
Eastern Orthodox   0.0130 -0.00772 -0.0440 
   (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0290) 
Other Christian denomination   0.0580** 0.0548** 0.0559** 
   (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0269) 
Jewish   -0.0142 0.0133 0.0309 
   (0.0890) (0.0900) (0.0909) 
Islamic   0.0632* 0.0105 0.00688 
   (0.0325) (0.0312) (0.0312) 
Eastern religions   0.0845 0.0476 0.0506 
   (0.0517) (0.0491) (0.0488) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.0984* 0.0847* 0.106** 
   (0.0528) (0.0506) (0.0510) 
Atheist   -0.000212 -0.00328 -0.00445 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.00698) (0.00684) (0.00690) 
Bad for the economy    -0.231*** -0.149*** 
    (0.00768) (0.00860) 
Generally take out more    -0.103*** -0.0635*** 
    (0.00737) (0.00781) 
Take jobs away    -0.116*** -0.0818*** 
    (0.00805) (0.00833) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0214*** -0.0125** 
    (0.00582) (0.00591) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.0513*** -0.0340*** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.00572) (0.00585) 
Extremely important Christian background     -0.0357*** 
     (0.00893) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0807*** 
     (0.0107) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0391*** 
     (0.00657) 
Worse place to live     -0.121*** 
     (0.00965) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0812*** 
     (0.00963) 
Constant 0.694*** 0.757*** 0.764*** 0.899*** 0.921*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0385) (0.0420) (0.0409) (0.0411) 
      
Observations 32,889 32,686 29,308 27,253 26,082 
R-squared 0.092 0.116 0.120 0.214 0.232 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 20– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT 
RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_diff_reg 
-demo 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco-atti 
AM_diff_reg 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.00168** -0.00224*** -0.00205** -0.000556 -2.88e-05 
 (0.000713) (0.000789) (0.000838) (0.000824) (0.000834) 
age2 -4.94e-05*** -1.52e-06 -1.17e-07 -1.03e-05 -1.13e-05 
 (7.06e-06) (7.76e-06) (8.22e-06) (8.12e-06) (8.25e-06) 
Male -0.00471 0.000244 0.000383 0.00155 0.00317 
 (0.00516) (0.00514) (0.00540) (0.00526) (0.00530) 
Citizens 0.00677 -0.0163 -0.0265 -0.0284 -0.0356 
 (0.0350) (0.0349) (0.0380) (0.0366) (0.0367) 
 
EDUCATION:  
     
Primary education  -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.0914*** -0.0826*** 
  (0.00972) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0105) 
Tertiary educ  0.175*** 0.176*** 0.118*** 0.107*** 
  (0.00638) (0.00656) (0.00641) (0.00644) 
Other  -0.0603 -0.0457 -0.112** -0.113** 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:  
 (0.0500) (0.0542) (0.0531) (0.0535) 
Self-employed  0.00632 0.0107 0.00243 0.00510 
  (0.00847) (0.00881) (0.00857) (0.00864) 
Working for own family business  -0.0577*** -0.0573*** -0.0644*** -0.0554*** 
  (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0204) 
Unemployed  0.0251** 0.0332*** 0.0243** 0.0246** 
 
 
 (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.105*** -0.0605*** -0.0475*** 
   (0.00788) (0.00772) (0.00780) 
Very close to country   -0.00635 -0.0259*** -0.0348*** 
   (0.0102) (0.00987) (0.00988) 
RELIGION:  
Protestant 
  0.0150 0.00395 0.00662 
   (0.0102) (0.00987) (0.00988) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.0415 -0.0537* -0.0811*** 
   (0.0299) (0.0294) (0.0309) 
Other Christian denomination   0.115*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
   (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0286) 
Jewish   0.0547 0.0679 0.0741 
   (0.0952) (0.0958) (0.0968) 
Islamic   0.152*** 0.0913*** 0.0811** 
   (0.0348) (0.0332) (0.0332) 
Eastern religions   0.192*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 
   (0.0557) (0.0527) (0.0523) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.101* 0.103* 0.111** 
   (0.0565) (0.0538) (0.0543) 
Atheist   0.0246*** 0.0200*** 0.0184** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.00747) (0.00727) (0.00734) 
Bad for the economy    -0.230*** -0.143*** 
    (0.00817) (0.00915) 
Generally take out more    -0.136*** -0.0808*** 
    (0.00783) (0.00831) 
Take jobs away    -0.111*** -0.0637*** 
    (0.00857) (0.00887) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0445*** -0.0303*** 
    (0.00619) (0.00630) 
Extremely important work skills 
 
   -0.0953*** -0.0750*** 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:     (0.00608) (0.00623) 
Extremely important Christian background     -0.0646*** 
     (0.00950) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0590*** 
     (0.0113) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0911*** 
     (0.00699) 
Worse place to live     -0.114*** 
     (0.0103) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0900*** 
     (0.0103) 
Constant 0.524*** 0.589*** 0.595*** 0.758*** 0.778*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0409) (0.0449) (0.0436) (0.0438) 
      
Observations 32,881 32,676 29,304 27,254 26,085 
R-squared 0.120 0.146 0.155 0.255 0.275 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 21– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY MUSLIMS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_Musl-demo AM_Musl-eco AM_Musl-eco&Non-eco AM_Musl-eco-atti AM_Musl-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.000585 -0.00384*** -0.00379*** -0.00241*** -0.00171** 
 (0.000705) (0.000776) (0.000826) (0.000821) (0.000832) 
age2 -4.77e-05*** 5.71e-06 8.11e-06 -3.18e-07 -3.36e-06 
 (6.99e-06) (7.64e-06) (8.10e-06) (8.10e-06) (8.24e-06) 
Male 0.00714 0.0125** 0.0118** 0.0179*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00509) (0.00504) (0.00530) (0.00523) (0.00528) 
Citizens 0.0248 0.00509 -0.00155 0.0117 0.0139 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0345) (0.0341) (0.0372) (0.0364) (0.0367) 
Primary education  -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.102*** -0.0922*** 
  (0.00956) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Tertiary educ  0.199*** 0.202*** 0.152*** 0.143*** 
  (0.00625) (0.00644) (0.00637) (0.00643) 
Other  -0.00304 0.00205 -0.0631 -0.0886* 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:   
 (0.0493) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0536) 
Self-employed  0.00341 0.0101 0.00807 0.00885 
  (0.00829) (0.00864) (0.00852) (0.00861) 
Working for own family business  -0.0187 -0.0112 -0.00911 0.000652 
  (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0205) 
Unemployed  0.0177* 0.0245** 0.0182 0.0178 
 
 
 (0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
political affiliation with extreme 
right 
  -0.113*** -0.0735*** -0.0602*** 
   (0.00774) (0.00768) (0.00778) 
Very close to country   0.000289 -0.0166* -0.0224** 
RELIGION:    (0.00997) (0.00981) (0.00986) 
Protestant   0.0201** 0.00591 0.00762 
   (0.0100) (0.00981) (0.00986) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.0439 -0.0548* -0.0647** 
   (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0308) 
Other Christian denomination   0.104*** 0.0966*** 0.0928*** 
   (0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0284) 
Jewish   0.163* 0.173* 0.179* 
   (0.0951) (0.0949) (0.0962) 
Islamic   0.291*** 0.232*** 0.222*** 
   (0.0342) (0.0331) (0.0332) 
Eastern religions   0.182*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 
   (0.0537) (0.0515) (0.0512) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.129** 0.130** 0.125** 
   (0.0548) (0.0530) (0.0536) 
Atheist   0.0363*** 0.0295*** 0.0275*** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.00733) (0.00723) (0.00732) 
Bad for the economy    -0.173*** -0.103*** 
    (0.00813) (0.00913) 
Generally take out more    -0.152*** -0.0907*** 
    (0.00779) (0.00829) 
Take jobs away    -0.0733*** -0.0286*** 
    (0.00853) (0.00885) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0430*** -0.0276*** 
    (0.00616) (0.00628) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.113*** -0.0960*** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.00605) (0.00621) 
Extremely important Christian 
background 
    -0.0732*** 
     (0.00946) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0348*** 
     (0.0113) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.122*** 
     (0.00698) 
Worse place to live     -0.0833*** 
     (0.0102) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0633*** 
     (0.0102) 
Constant 0.495*** 0.564*** 0.560*** 0.704*** 0.719*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0400) (0.0441) (0.0433) (0.0437) 
      
Observations 32,478 32,273 28,993 27,047 25,924 
R-squared 0.160 0.192 0.207 0.283 0.300 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 22– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_profEu 
-demo 
AM_profEu 
-eco 
AM_profEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_profEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_profEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.000500 -0.00339** -0.00367** -0.00266* -0.00245 
 (0.00137) (0.00152) (0.00159) (0.00159) (0.00160) 
age2 -1.98e-05 2.72e-05* 3.16e-05** 2.42e-05 2.43e-05 
 (1.35e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.57e-05) (1.58e-05) 
Male 0.0165* 0.0224** 0.0297*** 0.0303*** 0.0303*** 
 (0.00984) (0.00981) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Citizens -0.00260 -0.0220 -0.0739 -0.103 -0.0647 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0757) (0.0746) (0.0796) (0.0775) (0.0780) 
Primary education  -0.112*** -0.131*** -0.111*** -0.0934*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0199) 
Tertiary educ  0.160*** 0.158*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Other  0.0147 0.0704 0.00745 -0.00740 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:  
 (0.0887) (0.0996) (0.101) (0.0994) 
Self-employed  0.00257 0.0127 0.0110 0.0154 
  (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
Working for own family business  -0.0148 -0.0207 -0.00219 -0.00188 
  (0.0382) (0.0388) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
Unemployed  0.0148 0.0286 0.0187 0.00863 
 
 
 (0.0208) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0233) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.0700*** -0.0271* -0.0199 
   (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0151) 
Very close to country   0.0151 -0.00640 -0.0140 
 
RELIGION:  
  (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0188) 
Protestant   0.0224 0.0176 0.0182 
   (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
Eastern Orthodox   0.114* 0.133** 0.0892 
   (0.0633) (0.0632) (0.0699) 
Other Christian denomination   -0.0438 -0.0264 -0.0483 
   (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0553) 
Jewish   0.199 0.196 0.172 
   (0.215) (0.237) (0.235) 
Islamic   0.0122 0.00351 -0.0129 
   (0.0659) (0.0638) (0.0639) 
Eastern religions   0.135 0.0878 0.0980 
   (0.125) (0.119) (0.118) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.00692 0.0496 0.0273 
   (0.130) (0.124) (0.129) 
Atheist   0.00197 0.00832 0.00478 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
Bad for the economy    -0.153*** -0.0923*** 
    (0.0157) (0.0176) 
Generally take out more    -0.0972*** -0.0658*** 
    (0.0151) (0.0160) 
Take jobs away    -0.159*** -0.129*** 
    (0.0164) (0.0170) 
Extremely important educ    -9.91e-05 0.0114 
    (0.0119) (0.0121) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.0283** -0.0171 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.0117) (0.0120) 
Extremely important Christian background     -0.0518*** 
     (0.0184) 
Extremely important be white     -0.0729*** 
     (0.0223) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0505*** 
     (0.0133) 
Worse place to live     -0.107*** 
     (0.0198) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0216 
     (0.0199) 
Constant 0.673*** 0.738*** 0.793*** 0.927*** 0.916*** 
 (0.0840) (0.0845) (0.0915) (0.0898) (0.0905) 
      
Observations 8,191 8,135 7,307 6,823 6,546 
R-squared 0.092 0.117 0.127 0.199 0.214 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 23– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM 
NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_prof-nonEu 
-demo 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-eco 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent -0.00170 -0.00580*** -0.00630*** -0.00496*** -0.00366** 
 (0.00139) (0.00155) (0.00163) (0.00165) (0.00168) 
age2 -1.28e-05 3.42e-05** 4.12e-05** 3.22e-05** 2.27e-05 
 (1.38e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.67e-05) 
Male 0.00696 0.0109 0.00765 0.0130 0.0125 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
Citizens -0.0437 -0.0624 -0.112 -0.136* -0.137* 
 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0667) (0.0681) (0.0777) (0.0768) (0.0786) 
Primary education  -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.0791*** -0.0674*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0213) 
Tertiary educ  0.156*** 0.153*** 0.109*** 0.103*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Other  0.140 0.103 0.0763 0.0598 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:  
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111) 
Self-employed  0.0102 0.0257 0.0284 0.0231 
  (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
Working for own family business  0.0309 0.0476 0.0325 0.0398 
  (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0382) (0.0389) 
Unemployed  -0.00448 0.00110 0.00111 0.0154 
 
 
 (0.0214) (0.0237) (0.0241) (0.0245) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.0589*** -0.0277* -0.0102 
   (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0156) 
Very close to country 
 
  0.0199 -0.000913 -0.00973 
RELIGION:    (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0204) 
Protestant   0.00658 -0.000386 0.00119 
   (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0199) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.0153 -0.00463 -0.00160 
   (0.0553) (0.0564) (0.0591) 
Other Christian denomination   -0.0599 -0.0374 -0.0531 
   (0.0612) (0.0614) (0.0620) 
Jewish   0.0255 0.0719 0.141 
   (0.170) (0.163) (0.174) 
Islamic   0.166** 0.113* 0.105 
   (0.0661) (0.0647) (0.0647) 
Eastern religions   0.236* 0.205* 0.210* 
   (0.121) (0.116) (0.115) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.0523 0.0361 0.00891 
   (0.0991) (0.0971) (0.0986) 
Atheist   0.00345 -0.000132 0.00644 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149) 
Bad for the economy    -0.177*** -0.112*** 
    (0.0166) (0.0186) 
Generally take out more    -0.146*** -0.105*** 
    (0.0158) (0.0169) 
Take jobs away    -0.101*** -0.0662*** 
    (0.0172) (0.0179) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0171 -0.00349 
    (0.0126) (0.0129) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.0423*** -0.0253** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.0124) (0.0127) 
Extremely important Christian 
background 
    -0.0411** 
     (0.0195) 
Extremely important be white     -0.109*** 
     (0.0232) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0654*** 
     (0.0145) 
Worse place to live     -0.0870*** 
     (0.0210) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0585*** 
     (0.0209) 
Constant 0.707*** 0.777*** 0.829*** 0.964*** 0.962*** 
 (0.0775) (0.0806) (0.0912) (0.0908) (0.0928) 
      
Observations 8,197 8,137 7,317 6,782 6,505 
R-squared 0.104 0.124 0.129 0.201 0.215 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 24– Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_unskEu 
-demo 
AM_unskEu 
-eco 
AM_unskEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_unskEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_unskEu- 
Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.00553*** 0.00282* 0.00305* 0.00439** 0.00507*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00159) (0.00171) (0.00171) (0.00176) 
age2 -5.62e-05*** -2.08e-05 -2.09e-05 -2.98e-05* -3.26e-05* 
 (1.42e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.74e-05) 
Male 0.0101 0.0132 0.0122 0.0240** 0.0251** 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0111) 
Citizens 0.0943 0.0758 0.00764 -0.0240 -0.0702 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0652) (0.0644) (0.0710) (0.0706) (0.0719) 
Primary education  -0.0856*** -0.0960*** -0.0621*** -0.0672*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0212) (0.0215) (0.0221) 
Tertiary educ  0.180*** 0.183*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0135) 
Other  -0.136 -0.100 -0.176 -0.185 
 
MAIN WORKING CONDITION:  
 (0.116) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Self-employed  0.0233 0.0283 0.0183 0.0193 
  (0.0173) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
Working for own family business  0.0102 0.0445 0.104** 0.111** 
  (0.0402) (0.0430) (0.0448) (0.0457) 
Unemployed  0.0452** 0.0507** 0.0429* 0.0370 
 
 
 (0.0216) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0253) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.0541*** -0.0167 -0.00346 
   (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0161) 
Very close to country 
 
  -0.0387* -0.0457** -0.0534** 
RELIGION:    (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0211) 
Protestant   -0.0345* -0.0403** -0.0377* 
   (0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0208) 
Eastern Orthodox   -0.175*** -0.207*** -0.274*** 
   (0.0614) (0.0616) (0.0652) 
Other Christian denomination   0.0314 0.00837 0.0179 
   (0.0538) (0.0554) (0.0564) 
Jewish   0.0174 -0.0292 -0.0454 
   (0.189) (0.199) (0.198) 
Islamic   0.115* 0.0570 0.0471 
   (0.0682) (0.0657) (0.0669) 
Eastern religions   0.172* 0.139 0.129 
   (0.102) (0.0980) (0.100) 
Other non-Christian religions   -0.0381 -0.0290 -0.0240 
   (0.120) (0.116) (0.119) 
Atheist   -0.0113 -0.0201 -0.0174 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0154) 
Bad for the economy    -0.0893*** -0.0452** 
    (0.0168) (0.0192) 
Generally take out more    -0.121*** -0.0904*** 
    (0.0164) (0.0176) 
Take jobs away    -0.104*** -0.0843*** 
    (0.0182) (0.0190) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0636*** -0.0570*** 
    (0.0128) (0.0132) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.126*** -0.123*** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.0125) (0.0131) 
Extremely important Christian background     0.00613 
     (0.0194) 
Extremely important be white     0.0148 
     (0.0229) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.0729*** 
     (0.0146) 
Worse place to live     -0.0112 
     (0.0216) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0791*** 
     (0.0212) 
Constant 0.120 0.154** 0.260*** 0.442*** 0.493*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0773) (0.0859) (0.0856) (0.0875) 
      
Observations 8,317 8,273 7,372 6,865 6,558 
R-squared 0.108 0.133 0.141 0.208 0.216 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 25 – Multivariate linear regression of: ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED WORKERS FROM 
NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_unsk-nonEu 
-demo 
AM_unsk-nonEu 
-eco 
AM_unsk-nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_unsk-nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_unsk-nonE 
u-Non-eco-atti 
      
Age of respondent 0.00398*** 0.000813 0.000567 0.00248 0.00307* 
 (0.00141) (0.00156) (0.00167) (0.00169) (0.00172) 
age2 -6.39e-05*** -2.63e-05* -2.10e-05 -3.62e-05** -3.93e-05** 
 (1.40e-05) (1.53e-05) (1.65e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.71e-05) 
Male 0.00826 0.0127 0.0101 0.0106 0.0111 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0110) 
Citizens -0.00219 -0.0105 -0.0127 0.0547 0.0530 
 
EDUCATION:  
(0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0733) (0.0727) (0.0725) 
Primary education  -0.0715*** -0.0674*** -0.0476** -0.0433** 
  (0.0191) (0.0208) (0.0212) (0.0217) 
Tertiary educ  0.160*** 0.162*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0134) 
Other  -0.0290 -0.0211 0.00383 0.0239 
 
EMPLOYMENT:  
 (0.0938) (0.103) (0.103) (0.109) 
Self-employed  0.00366 0.00715 0.00503 -0.000520 
  (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0171) 
Working for own family business  -0.0523 -0.0376 -0.0192 -0.0202 
  (0.0395) (0.0421) (0.0431) (0.0435) 
Unemployed  0.0142 0.000707 0.00590 0.00317 
 
 
 (0.0217) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0253) 
political affiliation with extreme right   -0.0926*** -0.0553*** -0.0449*** 
   (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
Very close to country   -0.0183 -0.0304 -0.0363* 
 
RELIGION:  
  (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0198) 
Protestant   0.0140 0.00221 0.00571 
   (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0205) 
Eastern Orthodox   0.0183 -0.0406 -0.0276 
   (0.0566) (0.0576) (0.0603) 
Other Christian denomination   0.126** 0.0948 0.0998* 
   (0.0560) (0.0579) (0.0592) 
Jewish   0.258 0.248 0.285 
   (0.182) (0.194) (0.193) 
Islamic   0.152** 0.129* 0.133* 
   (0.0724) (0.0731) (0.0738) 
Eastern religions   0.226** 0.220** 0.210** 
   (0.0938) (0.0931) (0.0927) 
Other non-Christian religions   0.178* 0.128 0.125 
   (0.100) (0.1000) (0.0996) 
Atheist   0.0465*** 0.0406*** 0.0432*** 
 
ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0150) 
Bad for the economy    -0.131*** -0.0789*** 
    (0.0167) (0.0189) 
Generally take out more    -0.102*** -0.0491*** 
    (0.0158) (0.0169) 
Take jobs away    -0.0440** -0.0117 
    (0.0172) (0.0180) 
Extremely important educ    -0.0468*** -0.0403*** 
    (0.0125) (0.0129) 
Extremely important work skills    -0.125*** -0.116*** 
 
NON-ECONOMIC ATTITUDES:  
   (0.0124) (0.0127) 
Extremely important Christian 
background 
    -0.00878 
     (0.0196) 
Extremely important be white     0.00903 
     (0.0237) 
Crime problems made worse     -0.104*** 
     (0.0143) 
Worse place to live     -0.0702*** 
     (0.0210) 
Cultural life undermined     -0.0432** 
     (0.0211) 
Constant 0.239*** 0.277*** 0.292*** 0.345*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0799) (0.0868) (0.0867) (0.0869) 
      
Observations 8,023 7,989 7,165 6,678 6,392 
R-squared 0.089 0.110 0.123 0.182 0.193 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 26 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS 
FROM POOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_poor_Eu 
-demo 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_poor_Eu 
-eco-atti 
AM_poor_Eu 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE 0.144*** 0.124*** 0.114*** 0.0898*** 0.0705*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.0170) 
CH 0.184*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.0878*** 0.0745*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0187) (0.0188) 
DE 0.255*** 0.233*** 0.214*** 0.141*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
DK 0.0996*** 0.0666*** 0.0691*** 0.0160 -0.00377 
 (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0185) 
EE 0.00602 -0.0309* -0.0197 -0.0562*** -0.0689*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0186) (0.0190) 
ES 0.0746*** 0.0769*** 0.0791*** 0.0464*** 0.0223 
 (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0176) 
FI -0.0196 -0.0359** -0.0411** -0.118*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0172) 
FR 0.140*** 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.0889*** 0.0640*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
GB 0.0255 0.0204 0.00934 -0.00180 -0.0219 
 (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
HU -0.286*** -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.289*** -0.299*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0184) 
IE 0.00627 0.0110 0.0280* 0.0150 -0.00299 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0169) 
LT -0.00219 -0.0203 -0.0168 -0.0627*** -0.0692*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0187) 
NL 0.129*** 0.103*** 0.0862*** 0.000257 -0.0207 
 (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0172) 
NO 0.274*** 0.236*** 0.228*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0190) (0.0186) (0.0187) 
PL 0.170*** 0.157*** 0.190*** 0.128*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0191) 
PT 0.120*** 0.147*** 0.160*** 0.0941*** 0.0808*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0195) 
SE 0.436*** 0.416*** 0.408*** 0.273*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0182) 
SI 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0210) 
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Table 27 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS 
FROM POOR NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
VARIABLES AM_poor_nonEu 
-demo 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_poor_nonEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA 
BE 
 
0.102*** 
 
0.0818*** 
 
0.0689*** 
 
0.0425** 
 
0.0274 
 (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
CH 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.0482** 0.0403** 
 (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0188) (0.0189) 
CZ -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.169*** -0.165*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0173) 
DE 0.241*** 0.219*** 0.196*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0157) 
DK 0.0277 -0.00449 -0.00702 -0.0623*** -0.0756*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0188) (0.0184) (0.0186) 
EE -0.0927*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.161*** -0.177*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0191) 
ES 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.0715*** 0.0518*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0177) 
FI -0.0517*** -0.0681*** -0.0721*** -0.149*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0172) 
FR 0.0973*** 0.0891*** 0.0821*** 0.0369** 0.0163 
 (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0169) 
GB -0.00123 -0.00590 -0.0229 -0.0320* -0.0512*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0174) 
HU -0.283*** -0.289*** -0.292*** -0.296*** -0.308*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0186) 
IE -0.0252 -0.0219 -0.00359 -0.0207 -0.0370** 
 (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0170) 
LT -0.0358** -0.0547*** -0.0558*** -0.105*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0187) 
NL 0.131*** 0.104*** 0.0865*** -0.00198 -0.0151 
 (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
NO 0.259*** 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.109*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0186) (0.0188) 
PL 0.102*** 0.0888*** 0.112*** 0.0469** 0.0313 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0192) 
PT 0.0877*** 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.0614*** 0.0526*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0197) 
SE 0.475*** 0.456*** 0.446*** 0.313*** 0.297*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0183) 
SI 0.0954*** 0.0810*** 0.0795*** 0.0625*** 0.0460** 
 (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0204) (0.0209) (0.0212) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 28 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS 
OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY 
 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_same_reg 
-demo 
AM_same_reg 
-eco 
AM_same_reg 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_same_reg 
-eco-atti 
AM_same_reg 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE 0.0696*** 0.0548*** 0.0505*** 0.0495*** 0.0309** 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
CH 0.200*** 0.188*** 0.180*** 0.124*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
CZ -0.247*** -0.249*** -0.253*** -0.224*** -0.217*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0157) 
DE 0.243*** 0.220*** 0.208*** 0.157*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
DK 0.177*** 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.118*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
EE 0.0706*** 0.0359** 0.0389** 0.0165 0.0213 
 (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0174) 
ES -0.0393** -0.0229 -0.0209 -0.0310* -0.0479*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0161) 
FI -1.53e-05 -0.00950 -0.0188 -0.0622*** -0.0819*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0157) 
FR 0.0901*** 0.0894*** 0.0840*** 0.0705*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0154) 
GB -0.0367** -0.0319** -0.0303* -0.0302* -0.0446*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0158) 
HU -0.134*** -0.142*** -0.148*** -0.125*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0168) 
IE -0.0990*** -0.0881*** -0.0741*** -0.0673*** -0.0807*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
LT 0.0207 0.00639 0.000377 -0.0241 -0.0241 
 (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0170) 
NL 0.0744*** 0.0529*** 0.0481*** 0.00514 -0.0137 
 (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0158) 
NO 0.185*** 0.150*** 0.134*** 0.0716*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0171) 
PL 0.0256 0.0131 0.0267 -7.28e-05 -0.0103 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0174) 
PT -0.00614 0.0428** 0.0479*** 0.0159 0.00558 
 (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0179) 
SE 0.296*** 0.281*** 0.274*** 0.185*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0166) 
SI 0.0879*** 0.0754*** 0.0844*** 0.0877*** 0.0694*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0192) 
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Table 29 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY IMMIGRANTS 
OF DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS THE MAJORITY 
 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_diff_reg 
-demo 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_diff_reg 
-eco-atti 
AM_diff_reg 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA 
BE 0.104*** 0.0846*** 0.0779*** 0.0611*** 0.0451*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
CH 0.147*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.0609*** 0.0541*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
CZ -0.219*** -0.222*** -0.228*** -0.207*** -0.197*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0167) 
DE 0.281*** 0.256*** 0.238*** 0.169*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
DK 0.122*** 0.0895*** 0.0914*** 0.0441** 0.0311* 
 (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0180) (0.0180) 
EE 0.0154 -0.0244 -0.0205 -0.0493*** -0.0514*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0185) 
ES 0.0679*** 0.0791*** 0.0836*** 0.0622*** 0.0444*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0172) 
FI -0.000606 -0.0154 -0.0179 -0.0861*** -0.106*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0167) 
FR 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.0881*** 0.0642*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0164) 
GB 0.0626*** 0.0633*** 0.0594*** 0.0530*** 0.0351** 
 (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
HU -0.280*** -0.287*** -0.280*** -0.262*** -0.265*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0179) 
IE -0.00771 0.000680 0.0273* 0.0238 0.00736 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0165) 
LT 0.0713*** 0.0539*** 0.0610*** 0.0197 0.0223 
 (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0182) 
NL 0.210*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.1000*** 0.0849*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
NO 0.278*** 0.238*** 0.229*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0182) 
PL 0.0896*** 0.0756*** 0.102*** 0.0500*** 0.0378** 
 (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0186) 
PT 0.0705*** 0.112*** 0.124*** 0.0720*** 0.0641*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
SE 0.458*** 0.440*** 0.435*** 0.304*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
SI 0.151*** 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.132*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0205) 
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Table 30 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY MUSLIMS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_Musl-
demo 
AM_Musl-eco AM_Musl-
eco&Non-eco 
AM_Musl-eco-
atti 
AM_Musl-
Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA  
 
BE 
 
 
0.0904*** 
 
 
0.0675*** 
 
 
0.0570*** 
 
 
0.0297* 
 
 
0.0108 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0166) 
CH 0.139*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.0445** 0.0360** 
 (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0183) 
CZ -0.299*** -0.303*** -0.320*** -0.314*** -0.315*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0167) 
DE 0.277*** 0.249*** 0.232*** 0.163*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
DK 0.103*** 0.0641*** 0.0589*** 0.00483 -0.0143 
 (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0179) (0.0180) 
EE -0.123*** -0.167*** -0.171*** -0.206*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0185) 
ES -0.00523 0.00250 0.00576 -0.0225 -0.0487*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0172) 
FI 0.0433*** 0.0615*** -0.0694*** -0.142*** -0.166*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0167) 
FR 0.222*** 0.216*** 0.210*** 0.164*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0164) 
GB 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.0989*** 0.0714*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0168) 
HU -0.311*** -0.320*** -0.317*** -0.320*** -0.336*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0180) 
IE -0.0352** -0.0273* -0.00299 -0.0168 -0.0452*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0165) 
LT -0.148*** -0.169*** -0.171*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0182) 
NL 0.129*** 0.0991*** 0.0868*** 0.00289 -0.0171 
 (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0168) 
NO 0.236*** 0.191*** 0.180*** 0.0792*** 0.0889*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0181) 
PL -0.109*** -0.125*** -0.0929*** -0.163*** -0.177*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0185) 
PT -0.0348* 0.00552 0.0402** -0.0207 -0.0342* 
 (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0190) 
SE 0.407*** 0.386*** 0.375*** 0.244*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0177) 
SI 0.108*** 0.0934*** 0.107*** 0.0726*** 0.0497** 
 (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0205) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 31 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY 
PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_profEu 
-demo 
AM_profEu 
-eco 
AM_profEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_profEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_profEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE -0.0106 -0.0329 -0.0418 -0.0427 -0.0612* 
 (0.0320) (0.0317) (0.0324) (0.0317) (0.0318) 
CH 0.191*** 0.171*** 0.158*** 0.0971*** 0.0896** 
 (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0352) 
CZ -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.240*** -0.218*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0302) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0325) 
DE 0.248*** 0.225*** 0.212*** 0.150*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0295) (0.0291) (0.0293) 
DK 0.109*** 0.0837*** 0.0674* 0.0221 0.000537 
 (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0341) 
EE 0.0161 -0.0188 -0.0358 -0.0876** -0.0729* 
 (0.0349) (0.0347) (0.0375) (0.0371) (0.0378) 
ES -0.0866*** -0.0789** -0.0872*** -0.117*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0323) (0.0321) (0.0326) 
FI 0.0728** 0.0559* 0.0329 -0.0239 -0.0463 
 (0.0305) (0.0302) (0.0323) (0.0318) (0.0319) 
FR 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0314) (0.0321) (0.0315) (0.0317) 
GB 0.0767** 0.0760** 0.0736** 0.0441 0.0228 
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0326) (0.0321) (0.0323) 
HU -0.260*** -0.268*** -0.271*** -0.285*** -0.304*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0316) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0345) 
IE -0.0342 -0.0286 -0.00530 0.0109 -0.0233 
 (0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0312) (0.0307) (0.0313) 
LT -0.0401 -0.0600** -0.0831** -0.120*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0299) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0348) 
NL -0.0101 -0.0337 -0.0306 -0.0749** -0.0998*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0327) 
NO 0.197*** 0.155*** 0.134*** 0.0622* 0.0570 
 (0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0352) (0.0346) (0.0348) 
PL 0.0550* 0.0383 0.0558* 0.0313 0.000726 
 (0.0318) (0.0314) (0.0333) (0.0337) (0.0353) 
PT -0.00782 0.0283 0.0299 -0.000797 -0.0178 
 (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0362) (0.0358) (0.0360) 
SE 0.218*** 0.198*** 0.192*** 0.101*** 0.0738** 
 (0.0319) (0.0316) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0337) 
SI 0.0692* 0.0553 0.0574 0.0727* 0.0489 
 (0.0356) (0.0355) (0.0381) (0.0394) (0.0397) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 32 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY 
PROFESSIONAL WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
VARIABLES AM_prof-nonEu 
-demo 
AM_prof-
nonEu 
-eco 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_prof-
nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_prof-nonEu 
-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE 0.105*** 0.0860*** 0.0775** 0.0641* 0.0417 
 (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0329) (0.0330) 
CH 0.199*** 0.194*** 0.181*** 0.123*** 0.0963*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0371) 
CZ -0.115*** -0.109*** -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0329) (0.0330) (0.0336) 
DE 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.282*** 0.231*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0306) 
DK 0.193*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.105*** 0.0818** 
 (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0365) (0.0361) (0.0362) 
EE -0.0736** -0.104*** -0.0896** -0.132*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0362) 
ES -0.0102 0.00687 0.0154 -0.00639 -0.0387 
 (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0348) 
FI 0.00990 -0.000563 -0.00610 -0.0620* -0.0873*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0307) (0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0335) 
FR 0.251*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.219*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0334) 
GB 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0341) (0.0336) (0.0339) 
HU -0.213*** -0.221*** -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.257*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0351) (0.0357) (0.0365) 
IE -0.0923*** -0.0709** -0.0538* -0.0697** -0.0792** 
 (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0321) (0.0332) 
LT -0.0390 -0.0526* -0.0677* -0.0993*** -0.0861** 
 (0.0312) (0.0310) (0.0346) (0.0357) (0.0375) 
NL 0.0783** 0.0576* 0.0587* 0.00809 -0.0163 
 (0.0317) (0.0314) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0335) 
NO 0.192*** 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.0703* 0.0668* 
 (0.0348) (0.0345) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0367) 
PL 0.0677** 0.0609* 0.0883** 0.0717** 0.0604 
 (0.0337) (0.0334) (0.0358) (0.0366) (0.0387) 
PT 0.167*** 0.199*** 0.215*** 0.157*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0358) (0.0377) (0.0380) (0.0383) 
SE 0.290*** 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.181*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0324) (0.0347) (0.0349) (0.0353) 
SI 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.0961** 0.0765* 
 (0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0396) (0.0418) (0.0421) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 33 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED 
WORKERS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
VARIABLES AM_unskEu 
-demo 
AM_unskEu 
-eco 
AM_unskEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_unskEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_unskEu- 
Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE 0.103*** 0.0873*** 0.0835** 0.0380 0.0219 
 (0.0340) (0.0336) (0.0351) (0.0345) (0.0352) 
CH 0.297*** 0.277*** 0.287*** 0.214*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0362) (0.0380) (0.0378) (0.0385) 
CZ -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.146*** -0.153*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0307) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0350) 
DE 0.282*** 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.172*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0290) (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0317) 
DK 0.199*** 0.159*** 0.185*** 0.120*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0344) (0.0375) (0.0372) (0.0380) 
EE 0.192*** 0.146*** 0.170*** 0.135*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.0367) 
ES -0.0953*** -0.0961*** -0.0994*** -0.126*** -0.149*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0364) 
FI -0.0789** -0.0985*** -0.0775** -0.160*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0355) 
FR 0.278*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.206*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0339) 
GB 0.00833 -0.000273 0.0131 -0.00582 -0.0280 
 (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0351) (0.0348) (0.0357) 
HU -0.245*** -0.253*** -0.256*** -0.260*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0350) (0.0357) (0.0374) 
IE 0.00887 0.000689 0.00200 -0.0107 -0.0303 
 (0.0312) (0.0310) (0.0336) (0.0333) (0.0346) 
LT 0.0788** 0.0596* 0.0552 0.00384 -0.0444 
 (0.0310) (0.0307) (0.0345) (0.0361) (0.0383) 
NL 0.00764 -0.0212 -0.0172 -0.116*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0354) 
NO 0.286*** 0.241*** 0.254*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0352) (0.0383) (0.0379) (0.0387) 
PL 0.145*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.0602 0.0569 
 (0.0335) (0.0331) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0391) 
PT 0.0424 0.0744** 0.0968** 0.0252 0.0125 
 (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0404) 
SE 0.360*** 0.340*** 0.358*** 0.227*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0337) (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0379) 
SI 0.192*** 0.175*** 0.196*** 0.159*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0373) (0.0409) (0.0421) (0.0431) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
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Table 34 – Multivariate linear regression (COUNTRIES): ALLOW MANY UNSKILLED 
WORKERS FROM NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES AM_unsk-
nonEu 
-demo 
AM_unsk-
nonEu 
-eco 
AM_unsk-
nonEu 
-eco&Non-eco 
AM_unsk-
nonEu 
-eco-atti 
AM_unsk-nonE 
u-Non-eco-atti 
AUSTRIA      
BE 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.0828** 0.0732** 
 (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0346) 
CH 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.116*** 0.0625* 0.0520 
 (0.0365) (0.0360) (0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0382) 
CZ -0.0550* -0.0517* -0.0710** -0.0518 -0.0589* 
 (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0330) (0.0338) (0.0345) 
DE 0.197*** 0.179*** 0.155*** 0.103*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0291) (0.0309) (0.0313) (0.0315) 
DK 0.117*** 0.0911*** 0.0912** 0.0448 0.0309 
 (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0371) (0.0374) (0.0376) 
EE -0.0109 -0.0343 -0.0755* -0.0782* -0.109*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0352) (0.0394) (0.0406) (0.0414) 
ES 0.0361 0.0407 0.0411 0.0135 0.00169 
 (0.0322) (0.0321) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0352) 
FI -0.0682** -0.0817*** -0.0956*** -0.154*** -0.173*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0310) (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0347) 
FR 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.200*** 0.170*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0321) (0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0341) 
GB 0.0251 0.0210 -0.0109 -0.00255 -0.0155 
 (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0338) (0.0341) (0.0345) 
HU -0.164*** -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.185*** -0.209*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0327) (0.0352) (0.0366) (0.0375) 
IE -0.0211 -0.0133 -0.00680 -0.0180 -0.0440 
 (0.0314) (0.0312) (0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0345) 
LT 0.0124 0.00197 -0.000381 -0.00915 -0.0388 
 (0.0312) (0.0309) (0.0345) (0.0357) (0.0373) 
NL 0.0453 0.0225 -0.00291 -0.0807** -0.0805** 
 (0.0322) (0.0319) (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0346) 
NO 0.183*** 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.0649* 0.0782** 
 (0.0347) (0.0344) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0371) 
PL 0.0924*** 0.0829** 0.107*** 0.0561 0.0207 
 (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0352) (0.0361) (0.0379) 
PT 0.150*** 0.172*** 0.158*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0389) (0.0396) (0.0400) 
SE 0.477*** 0.462*** 0.451*** 0.342*** 0.322*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0357) (0.0365) (0.0370) 
SI -0.00443 -0.0129 -0.0207 -0.0509 -0.0667 
 (0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0394) (0.0412) (0.0417) 
 
The standard error in parenthesis are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0 .05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
